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I. INTRODUCTION
I CONSIDER MYSELF quite privileged to have been asked to
present this year's Recent Develapments in Aviation Law Article
at the 30th Annual SMU Air Law Symposium. This undertaking
is both quite an honor and quite a large project. I hope that the
Article which follows will provide the reader with a reasonably
comprehensive report of aviation case law decisions which were
issued between December 1, 1994, and November 30, 1995. We
have attempted to uncover and report not only those opinions
which were published, but some unpublished ones as well.
However, it is inevitable that we missed some cases, which
should be interpreted as inadvertence and not any type of re-
flection of the importance of the missing matter. Quite simply,
we did the best we could.
Although the information contained in this Article is believed
to have been current and accurate as of the date of the Sympo-
sium, it is entirely possible that subsequent events have occurred
which call into question any of the information contained
herein. As all prudent attorneys are well aware, any attempt to
use case law as authoritative should be accompanied by a confir-
mation that the decision has not been changed, altered, re-
scinded, or subject to any other whim of the judicial system.
This Article is simply not a one-person project and would not
have been possible without the extensive participation and ef-
forts of an extraordinary attorney in my firm, Elaine D. Solo-
mon. Elaine, who is known to many of you, approached this
project in her usual diligent, comprehensive, and aggressive
manner. She has spent many hours on this project and is enti-
tled to my unending gratitude. Additional thanks go to my part-
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ner Ellen Rogoff for assisting with the editing, paralegal Lisa
Cabnet for helping with the cite checking, my secretary Kathy
Nahill who managed to type and revise never ending drafts of
this Article, and secretary Lorraine Hicks for pitching in to assist
with those duties. To those persons, as well as others I may have
omitted, my heartfelt thanks.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
In 1995, the Second Circuit decided Airlines Reporting Corp. v.
S & N Travel, Inc.' This case involved an attempt by the Airlines
Reporting Corp. (ARC) to recover the value of tickets issued to
one of its member travel agencies for which payment had never
been received. The tickets had been issued for numerous cus-
tomers to travel on twenty-nine different air carriers, only one of
which was individually owed more than fifty thousand dollars.
ARC functioned as a clearing house and collection agent cre-
ated by a consortium of domestic air carriers which acted as an
intermediary between travel agents and the carriers. The de-
fendants sought dismissal, arguing that the federal court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff was acting as a
mere conduit for the claims of the various airlines. When
viewed on an individual basis, the defendants argued that the
only airline which met the minimum amount in controversy was
incorporated in the same state as the defendants and, therefore,
subject to dismissal for lack of diversity jurisdiction.' In re-
sponse, the plaintiff received assignments of the claims of sev-
eral other defendants. However, the court rejected the
assignments, stating that the "transfer of legal tide to the claims
between the parties can easily be arranged, increasing the po-
tential for collusion and compounding the difficulty in de-
tecting the true purpose for the assignment."4 Since the
plaintiff "paid no meaningful consideration for the assign-
ments" and admitted that any recovery would be returned to the
assignees, the court found that the assignments were motivated
"by a desire to remain in federal court" and dismissed the case.'
In De Aguilar v. Boeing Co.6, personal representatives of estates
and relatives of persons who died in a 1986 Mexicana Airlines
1 58 F.3d 857 (2d Cir. 1995).
2 Id. at 860.
S Id. at 860-61.
4 Id. at 863.
5 Id. at 864.
6 47 F.3d 1404 (5th Cir. 1995).
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crash first filed suit in a Texas state court, but the action was
removed to federal court by the defendants. The case was then
dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds.7 Plaintiffs then filed
suit in an Illinois state court and a Washington state court with
the same result. The Texas Supreme Court declared that the
forum non conveniens doctrine was no longer recognized under
Texas state law for wrongful death actions.' Therefore, plaintiffs
again filed suit in Texas state court without specifying the
amount of damages sought. The action was removed and there-
after dismissed on estoppel and forum non conveniens grounds.9
The Fifth Circuit affirmed that decision, holding that defend-
ants had produced evidence and precedents indicating that the
matter in controversy exceed the federal jurisdictional require-
ment of fifty thousand dollars. 10
Plaintiffs filed a third Texas state court action, alleging, in vio-
lation of Texas law, that their claims did not exceed fifty thou-
sand dollars. 1 In order to make their argument, plaintiffs
purported to be making their claims as heirs, and not as per-
sonal representatives of the various estates. Defendants again
removed the action to Texas federal district court. In their no-
tice of removal, defendants demonstrated that plaintiffs' pur-
ported limitation on the amount of the claims of the decedents'
estates was meaningless and that without an effective limitation
the amount in controversy exceeded fifty thousand dollars per
decedent.'2 The court noted that the plaintiffs had not shown
that they had the authority to limit damages sought to be recov-
ered by the estates.13 Shortly thereafter, the judge granted a
motion by defendants to dismiss the action pursuant to the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens.14 Petitioners appealed the dismis-
sal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals which affirmed the
district court's denial of petitioner's motion for remand and the
dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens.15
The Fifth Circuit held that defendants had "easily" shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that the actual amount in con-
7 Id. at 1406.
8 Id. at 1408.
9 De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 806 F. Supp. 139, 142-43 (E.D. Tex. 1992).
10 De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 11 F.2d 55, 58-59 (5th Cir. 1993).
11 De Aguilar, 47 F.3d at 1406.
12 Id. at 1407.
13 Id. at 1411.
14 Id. at 1406.
15 Id.
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troversy exceeded fifty thousand dollars.1 6 The court further
held that the statements in plaintiffs' pleading will not control if
made in bad faith, and plaintiffs acknowledged that their filing
in state court violated Rule 47(b) of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure. 17 The court rejected plaintiffs' attempt to manipu-
late the pleadings and ruled that the prayer for damages in the
original petition did not limit the amount in controversy.18 The
court agreed with defendants' argument that plaintiffs, seeking
to avoid federal court, had manipulated their pleadings to "cre-
ate the illusion" that the amount in controversy was less than the
jurisdictional minimum of fifty thousand dollars. 9 On October
3, 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the Fifth
Circuit's final decision. 0
The plaintiff in Ayrault v. Pena" entered the FAA's Coopera-
tive Education Program in 1989 at the Cleveland Air Route Traf-
fic Control Center. She was later removed from her position for
allegedly disregarding her supervisor's direction and for being
argumentative. Her suit in the U.S. Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois was dismissed, based upon the trial court's ruling
that she was not an "employee" and therefore not entitled to
various procedural protections accorded under the Civil Service
Reform Act (CSRA). The Seventh Circuit held that the district
judge lacked jurisdiction and remanded with instructions to dis-
miss the case.22 Plaintiff argued that although she was excluded
from the definition of "employee" under the CSRA, she had
served as a co-op student well over the two years required by
another subsection of the CSRA. The Seventh Circuit ruled,
however, that if the plaintiff was not an employee, then the stat-
utory theme deprived the court ofjurisdiction.2 1 Further, plain-
tiff had not filed a claim with the Merit System Protection Board
and, therefore, had failed to exhaust administrative remedies,
waiving a right to judicial review. 24
In Machline v. National Helicopters,25 suit was brought in New
York regarding a helicopter crash in New Jersey in which plain-
16 Id. at 1412.
17 Id. at 1410.
18 Id. at 1412-13.
19 Id. at 1407.
20 Id. at 1413.
21 60 F.3d 346 (7th Cir. 1995).
22 Id. at 350.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 No. 94-CIV-8456, 1995 WL 251540 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 1995).
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tiff's decedents who were Brazilian citizens and residents were
killed. The defendants were owners and operators of the heli-
copter which was headquartered and doing business in New
York. The defendants filed a forum non conveniens motion and
both parties submitted conflicting expert affidavits as to whether
the Brazilian courts would entertain the lawsuit. The district
court declined to resolve the issue definitively. However, it de-
nied the defendants' forum non conveniens motion, noting that
"no American Court has dismissed in favor of a Brazilian forum
an action against an American defendant for an accident occur-
ring in America."2 6 Therefore, the court concluded that it did
not believe that the convenience of the parties or any equitable
interest required that the plaintiff be compelled "to explore
murky waters of Brazilian jurisprudence to pursue the claims as-
serted in the complaint."2 7
Credit Lyonnais v. Getty Square Associates 2 8 a case involving the
concept of "pooling" foreign interests under the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act (FSIA) to create federal jurisdiction, a for-
eign mortgagee corporation brought a foreclosure action in the
district court against the mortgagor partnership and its general
partner. The defendants moved for summary judgment, alleg-
ing that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The plain-
tiff mortgagee claimed that jurisdiction existed under 28 U.S.C.
section 1332(a) (4), which grants original jurisdiction to district
courts when the amount at issue exceeds fifty thousand dollars
and is between a "foreign state," which is defined in section
1603 (a) as plaintiff and citizens of a state or of different states as
defendants.2 9
Credit Lyonnais argued that it fit within the definition of "for-
eign state" because a majority of its shares were owned by the
Republic of France. France directly owned 48.5% of the out-
standing shares and the French government also had an owner-
ship interest in a corporation which owned another percentage
ownership. Therefore, plaintiff argued that after pooling the
ownership interests, France was a 57.17% shareholder.3 °
The court noted that there was no "direct authority allowing
one foreign state to pool its ownership interests in different enti-
26 Id. at *2.
27 Id.
28 876 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
29 Id. at 519.
30 Id. at 519-20.
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ties to satisfy the requirements of section 1603(b) (2)." s' How-
ever, the court acknowledged that other courts had allowed
pooling of ownership interests of several foreign states, although
in this case, only one foreign state was attempting to pool its
own ownership interests. 32 Thus, the court held that "[i]f sev-
eral states can pool their ownership interests, then so too should
one foreign entity be allowed to pool its own ownership interests
for the purposes of determining whether the litigant is a 'for-
eign state' under section 1603(b) (2)." as The court did not feel
that "[s]uch a result ... [would] distort the plain meaning of
the [FSIA]. Therefore, the court had subject matter jurisdic-
tion over this case.
Air Crashes At Katmandu, NepaP5 are cases that arose out of the
crash of Thai Airways International Flight 311 into a mountain
after a missed approach procedure during a nonprecision ap-
proach to Katmandu on July 31, 1992. All individuals on board
were killed, including ninety-nine passengers and fourteen crew
members. The cases also involved a crash of Pakistan Interna-
tional Airlines Flight 268, which was an Airbus A300, striking a
mountain during a similar approach to Katmandu in September
1992. As a result of that crash, all 148 passengers and 19 crew
members were killed. The lawsuits arising from these two acci-
dents were originally filed in two separate state courts, but were
later consolidated, and Airbus removed them to federal court.
Airbus filed motions to dismiss based upon its foreign sover-
eign immunity status, forum non conveniens, lack of personal juris-
diction, and failure to add indispensable parties. The other co-
defendants filed a motion to dismiss solely on the basis of lack of
personal jurisdiction. U.S. District Court Chief Judge Nor-
man W. Black of the Southern District of Texas dismissed all
cases against Airbus on all grounds and dismissed the co-defend-
ants for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court held that Airbus
was owned by foreign states during the relevant time period,
noting that a foreign state retains immunity even after a govern-
ment's interest is later transferred to private ownership. There-
fore, foreign states may pool their interest in an entity for
purposes of determining whether that entity is a foreign state
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act.




35 Nos. H-9-3065, G-93-601, G-93-610, G-93-611 (S.D. Tex.June 13, 1995).
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Judge Black also dismissed the cases on the basis of forum non
conveniens, holding that private and public interests weighed in
favor of dismissal. All the evidence in the suit, including most of
the witnesses, was in countries and states other than Texas. The
court further noted that the litigation clearly was not a local con-
troversy, since the flights originated in Thailand or Pakistan, the
aircraft was designed, assembled and sold in France, and was
operated by pilots trained outside the United States. The court
also held that the airline owners and operators of the aircraft
were necessary and indispensable parties and that none of the
defendants conducted business in Texas. Therefore, no per-
sonal jurisdiction existed over the defendants.
In Katonah v. USAir, Inc.,36 U.S. District Judge Charles Norgle
of the Northern District of Illinois, by Order dated February 15,
1995, again remanded eleven suits arising from the September
1994 crash of USAir Flight 427 near Pittsburgh to Cook County
Illinois Circuit Court. USAir had argued that plaintiffs had
fraudulently joined USAir mechanic supervisor Gerald Fox, a
Chicago-based nondiverse defendant, who had received an
anonymous phone call about an unusual noise on the aircraft
several hours before the crash. The court did "not agree with
USAir that it was not reasonably foreseeable that an accident
would occur following an account of an errant noise not noted
by the pilot."37 In addition, the court found "other factors con-
cerning the duty of care [were] in favor of imposing a duty on
Fox.""8 Further, "the potential extent of injury resulting from a
crash was so great as to outweigh all the burdens of
prevention. 3 9
Cheng v. United Airlines, Inc.40 involved a personal injury
caused by turbulence. The court followed the Second and Fifth
Circuits' rulings on the exclusivity of the Warsaw Convention ac-
tions and preemption of state law when the Convention's causes
of action apply.41 The court held that the Warsaw Convention
cause of action preempted plaintiffs parallel state law cause of
action based upon negligence in connection with the turbu-
lence incident.42 Plaintiff also asserted additional claims for
36 876 F. Supp. 984 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
37 Id. at 988.
s8 Id.
39 Id.
40 No. 93-G-149, 1995 WL 42157 (N.D. 11. Jan. 31, 1995).
41 Id. at *2-3.
42 Id. at *3.
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crew misconduct regarding delays in taking plaintiff to a hospi-
tal and other assorted claims relating to the treatment plaintiff
received after disembarking. The court held that these other
claims were not within the scope of the treaty, and, therefore,
those state law causes of action were not preempted by the War-
saw Convention.43
In Wahl v. Continental Airlines, Inc.,44 the court denied the
Wahl's motion to remand a cargo lawsuit against Continental
Airlines to state court, holding that the Warsaw Convention ap-
plied to keep the action in federal court. Wahl had filed suit in
Pennsylvania state court alleging that Continental had failed to
safeguard and secure his luggage.45 Continental filed a Notice
of Removal to the Eastern District, and Wahl moved to remand.
Plaintiff argued that the Convention did not apply because all of
the occurrences giving rise to the action had taken place within
the United States.46
The court held, however, that "case law ... establishes that a
domestic leg of international transportation by aircraft for hire
is considered international travel and is governed by the [Con-
vention] .47 Plaintiff also contended that federal court lacked
jurisdiction because the complaint contained only state law
claims and a federal question did not appear on the face of the
well-pleaded complaint.48 However, the court ruled that it is
well established that certain federal statutes are so pervasively
preemptive that any related state law action is deemed to be a
federal claim from the start.49 The action is removable even
though only a state law claim appears on the face of the com-
plaint.50 The court also noted that the Third Circuit had held
that when the Warsaw Convention applies, it is the exclusive
remedy for actions against air carriers.5 Since the plaintiff's
cause of action involved the loss of baggage on an international
flight, it presented a federal question and properly belonged in
federal court.
43 Id. at *4.
- No. 95-0058, 1995 WL 263542 (E.D. Pa. May 2, 1995).
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Silver Hilton Steelhead Lodge v. Central Mountain Air, Ltd.12 and
Central Mountain Air, Ltd. v. Superior Court5 3 arose out of the
crash of a Central Mountain Air (CMA) Cessna 206 in Northern
British Columbia. Petitioners had contended that the California
courts did not have personal jurisdiction. The estates of three
occupants killed in the crash on their way to Silver Hilton filed
suit in San Francisco County Superior Court against CMA. De-
fendants moved to quash service of the summons in the litiga-
tion, which was denied.
On appeal, the court ruled that there was no basis for jurisdic-
tion over CMA in California since the airline operated solely in
Canada and did not own property, advertise, or bank in Califor-
nia. Furthermore, CMA had not contracted directly with one of
the survivors of the crash, but rather with Silver Hilton. As to
Silver Hilton, the appellate court found that it had sufficient
California contacts through one of the survivors of the crash
who had sold the fishing trip to Silver Hilton as well as serving as
its agent throughout the state for purposes of booking lodging
trips. However, the court concluded that Silver Hilton's activi-
ties in California were not sufficient to warrant general jurisdic-
tion in California for causes of action unrelated to California.
The panel also applied a balancing test to determine whether
there was sufficient nexus between the California activities and
the cause of action, concluding that jurisdiction should be de-
nied. The court stated that the evidence as to the cause of ac-
tion was in Canada, the liability of both CMA and Silver Hilton
was still to be determined, and California might not have the
power to compel attendance of relevant witnesses. Further, to
find jurisdiction over Silver Hilton in California where the liabil-
ity of CMA could not be tried invited multiplicity of actions and
conflicting adjudications. Finally, the court found that there
was an insufficient nexus between defendants' local activities
and the State of California in that there was no close nexus be-
tween the promotion and sale of a fishing trip in California and
the crash of an airplane in Canada, even though the fishing trip
included the transportation.




III. PREEMPTION OF STATE TORT CLAIMS
The Airline Deregulation Act includes a preemption clause at
§1305 (a) (1) as follows: "'[N]o state . . . shall enact or enforce
any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the
force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any
air carrier. . .. ""' In 1992, the Supreme Court construed the
"'relating to"' language as preempting state regulation having a
"'connection with, or reference to airline rates, routes, or serv-
ices."' 55 Despite this broad definition of "relating to," the preva-
lent view among the lower courts has been that state law tort
claims for injuries sustained during flights are not preempted by
the ADA. This latest Supreme Court decision is consistent with
that view.
In Wolens, the plaintiffs challenged American Airlines's retro-
active changes to its Frequent Flyer program under the Illinois
Consumer Fraud Act and based upon breach of contract. The
Court held that plaintiffs' claims could not be brought under
the state Act because the statute would then have the effect of
regulating the marketing practices of the airline. 56 The Court
did allow, however, plaintiffs' contractual claims. Plaintiffs'
breach of contract claims were based not upon a violation of a
state-imposed obligation, but rather the breach of a private, vol-
untary, contractual obligation.57 Therefore, the breach of con-
tract claims were not preempted by the ADA. The Court felt
that this construction was consistent with Congress's retention
of the savings clause in the statute which preserves remedies ex-
isting at common law or by statute. 58 The Court pointed out
that counsel for the airline and the government in its amicus
curiae brief independently agreed that plaintiffs' negligence
claims were not preempted. 59 Therefore, private tort actions
based upon common law negligence or fraud, or on a statutory
prohibition against fraud, were not preempted.
In Johnson v. American Airlines, Inc.,60 the Court, without issu-
ing a written opinion, vacated an Illinois appellate court ruling
54 American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817, 821 (1995) (quoting 49
U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V)).
55 Id. (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2031, 2037
(1992)).
56 Id. at 823-24.
57 Id. at 824.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 825 n.7.
60 115 S. Ct. 1247 (1995).
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that suits filed against American Airlines and United Airlines
challenging a ticket cancellation charge were preempted by the
ADA. Plaintiff Arthur Johnson had instituted a class action
breach of contract suit against American after being assessed a
twenty-five percent penalty for canceling his ticket.61 The Bas-
kins filed a similar suit against United Airlines. Both actions
were dismissed by the trial court as preempted by the Act. The
Illinois appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling, citing
the Court's 1992 decision in Morales, which gave broad meaning
to the phrase "relating to."62 Johnson and Baskins had filed a
petition for Supreme Court reviewJanuary 4, 1995, arguing that
a decision should be deferred pending the Supreme Court's rul-
ing in Wolens. Since that decision was issued on January 18,
1995, the Court apparently decided no comment was necessary
for this ruling.
In Fressie v. Trans World Airlines,63 the Court denied plaintiff's
petition for certiorari on January 23, 1995. Fressie's claims
against TWA had been held as preempted by the Airline Dereg-
ulation Act of 1978. Fressie had sued for false arrest, malicious
prosecution, breach of contract, and damages due to TWA's re-
fusal to honor his ticket and boarding pass for a flight from New
York to Paris. The Third Circuit affirmed a summary judgment
motion in favor of TWA and had argued that Fressie's action was
preempted by section 1305 of the Act, which bars suits relating
to an airline's rates, routes or services.64 TWA responded to
Fressie's Supreme Court petition by arguing that no conflict ex-
isted among the courts on the preemptive effect of section 1305
with respect to ticketing, boarding, and seating claims. Fressie,
however, cited the Court's 1992 ruling in Morales which held
that state actions affecting rates, routes, and services in too tenu-
ous, remote, or peripheral a manner are not preempted. Ac-
cordingly, Fressie argued that suits grounded in common law
theories of tort and contract do not directly affect the airline's
ability to conduct its daily business.
Gay v. Carlson6 5 arose out of claims filed by a Pan Am pilot
who had been fired for allegedly allowing a flight attendant to
control a Boeing 747 during a flight from New York to Los An-
61 Johnson v. American Airlines, Inc., 633 N.E.2d 978, 978 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
62 Id. at 979.
6s 115 S. Ct. 955 (1995).
64 Fressie v. Trans World Airlines, 31 F.3d 1171 (3d Cir. 1994) (unpublished
disposition).
65 60 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 1995).
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geles. Pilot Harold Gay was found guilty of misconduct by Pan
Am and fired December 31, 1988. He filed a grievance and was
reinstated with full back pay and seniority rights due to a finding
that he had been deprived of a full and fair investigation.66
Gay then filed suit against Pan Am's vice president and twelve
other employees, alleging they had conspired to fabricate offi-
cial reports to have him fired.67 Most of the claims were dis-
missed. The court also ruled certain state law claims were
preempted by the Railway Labor Act.68
The Second Circuit held that Gay's state law defamation,
prima facie tort, and conspiracy claims were not preempted,
since no interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement
was required to resolve those claims.69 The claims involved only
factual questions concerning Gay's conduct and that of the fel-
low employees. The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of
the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, finding no
basis for concluding that the conduct alleged went beyond all
possible bounds of decency. 70
In Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,7 1 the court held that a passen-
ger's state law tort claim for physical injury based upon negli-
gent operation of the aircraft was not preempted by the ADA.7'
The plaintiff had been injured when a fellow passenger opened
an overhead compartment and dislodged a case of rum. The
court held that the ADA was concerned solely with economic
deregulation and not with displacing state tort law.73 In reach-
ing its decision, the court also relied in part on the fact that
federal law requires air carriers to maintain liability insurance.
"A complete preemption of state law in this area would have
rendered any requirement of insurance coverage nugatory."74
In rendering its decision, the Fifth Circuit was careful to note,
however, that not all state tort claims would survive ADA pre-
emption. As an example, claims arising from the eviction of
loud, boisterous, and intoxicated passengers would be pre-
empted by the ADA, because to enforce such claims "would re-
66 Id. at 85-86.
67 Id. at 86.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 88.
70 Id. at 89.
71 44 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
72 Id. at 340.
73 Id. at 338-39.
74 Id. at 338.
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suit in significant de facto regulation of an airline's boarding
practices and, moreover, would interfere with federal law grant-
ing the airlines substantial discretion to refuse to carry passen-
gers."75 In addition, the Court noted that claims based upon the
bumping of a passenger from a flight would also be preempted
by its interpretation of "relating to" services.76
Smith v. America West Airlines, InC.7 7 arose out of claims based
upon an airline's failure to prevent a hijacker from boarding an
aircraft. The Fifth Circuit held that such claims were not pre-
empted by the ADA.78 The court held that neither the language
nor history of the ADA implies that Congress was attempting to
displace state personal injury tort law concerning the safety of
the airline business. The court felt that it was reasonable to in-
terpret the term "service" of boarding to be limited to economic
decisions concerning boarding, such as overbooking or charter
arrangements, or contractual decisions whether to board partic-
ular ticketed passengers.79
Harris v. American Airlines, Inc.8 ° involved claims by a black pas-
senger on an American Airlines flight alleging that he was sub-
jected to repeated racial slurs from a white male passenger
known only as John Doe.8 1 Passenger Doe had been served sev-
eral drinks both prior to and during the flight, despite at least
one flight attendant declining to serve him additional drinks af-
ter takeoff. The plaintiff filed suit in Oregon state court, stating
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negli-
gence, and violation of the State Public Accommodations Stat-
ute. 2 American Airlines removed the case to federal court on
the basis of diversity jurisdiction. American then sought sum-
mary judgment based upon preemption under section
1305(a) (1) of the Airline Deregulation Act and on the merits."
In response to American Airlines's preemption argument, plain-
tiff argued that state tort claims concerning the flight crew's ac-
tions in continuing to serve alcoholic beverages to an already
intoxicated en route passenger did not constitute a state regula-
75 Id. at 339.
76 Id. at 339-40.
77 44 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 1995).
78 Id. at 347.
79 Id.
80 55 F.3d 1472 (9th Cir. 1995).




tion of an economic decision concerning what airline services to
provide. 4 Instead, 'plaintiff argued that her claim involved the
airline's negligence in agreeing to provide liquor to passengers
and in failing to protect plaintiffs safety.85
The lower court granted summary judgment on the merits.
The Ninth Circuit never reached the merits of the state law
claims and held that the claims were preempted. 6 The court
held that the allegations related directly to the "service" of pro-
viding alcoholic beverages to passengers and the manner of
treating intoxicated passengers, and the court also determined
that plaintiff was unable to demonstrate that her claims came
within the narrow preemption exclusion set forth by the
Supreme Court in Wolens because plaintiffs claims were based
on Oregon state law, rather than private contract terms as in the
Wolens case.87
The one dissenting opinion in Harris points out that the ma-
jority opinion creates an intercircuit conflict with two recent de-
cisions in the Fifth Circuit: Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc. and
Smith v. American West Airlines, Inc.88 The dissenting opinion also
pointed out that the majority's reliance upon Wolens was mis-
placed since, among other things, "the Supreme Court sug-
gested [in the Wolens decision] that personal injury claims
against airline carriers were not preempted by the ADA.89
In Lathigra v. British Airways PLC,90 plaintiffs had been flying
on British Air from Seattle to Madagascar, with a connecting
flight from Nairobi, Kenya, to their final destination. British Air
had confirmed the reservations, but failed to mention the dis-
continuation of the connecting flight. The family filed suit for
delay damages in state court, and British Air removed the action
to the Western District of Washington where it was dismissed. 91
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Washington state law
governed the claim and that the district court had erred in ap-
plying the two-year Warsaw Convention limitation.92 British
84 Id. at 1476.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 1477.
87 Id.
& Id. (Norris, J., dissenting) (citing Hodges, 44 F.3d 334; Smith v. America West
Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
89 Id. at 1478.
90 41 F.3d 535 (9th Cir. 1995).
91 Id. at 536-37.
92 Id. at 537.
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Air's liability was based upon negligence in reconfirming the
reservations and not upon a delay in transportation by air. The
Ninth Circuit also rejected British Airway's federal preemption
argument, citing the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Morales,
holding that state law causes of action are allowed where there is
"'too tenuous, remote, or peripheral' an effect on air carrier
services for the FAA to preempt it."93 In seeking reconsidera-
tion, British Air argued that the appellate court had erred in
holding that because the plaintiffs characterized their claims as
based upon negligent ticketing, the action was not subject to
Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention, which holds a carrier lia-
ble for damage occasioned by delay in the transportation by air
of passengers, baggage, or goods. British Air had argued, in
part, that the Warsaw Convention applied because plaintiffs had
failed to commence suit against British Air until the two-year
limitation period for commencing a Warsaw action had expired.
However, there was a three-year statute of limitations for their
Washington state law claim, and, thus, plaintiffs' claim was not
time-barred.
In Rowley v. American Airlines,94 the court held that the ADA
did not preempt plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress arising from the airline's failure to provide
her with a special wheelchair aisle seat. Plaintiff also claimed
that the airline failed to assist her to and from her seat during
the flight and that it left her in a chair at the baggage claim area
for over an hour. In reaching its holding, the court held that
although the plaintiff's claim involved her boarding and de-
planing, it did "not impact general practice of American Airlines
relating to the boarding, seating or deplaning of passengers,
handicapped or otherwise, on airline flights."95 In addition,
"the claims [were not contravened for] the purpose of the ADA
to promote competitive market forces. "96
Chukwu v. Board of Directors Varig Airlines9 7 and Chukwu v. Board
of Directors British Airways"8 present two breach of contract cases
brought against two airlines alleging that it wrongfully refused
to board a passenger based upon a misunderstanding of immi-
gration requirements. In Varig, the passenger had purchased a
9s Id. at 540 (citing Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2040).
94 875 F. Supp. 708 (D. Or. 1995).
95 Id. at 712.
96 Id.
97 880 F. Supp. 891 (D. Mass. 1995).
98 889 F. Supp. 12 (D. Mass. 1995).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ticket to fly from Nigeria to Grand Caymans with a stopover in
Miami. The passenger did not have a U.S. visa, but claimed that
such a document was not required for a stopover of less than
eight hours. The airline refused to board the passenger and re-
funded the price of his ticket. However, the plaintiff brought
suit for $3.5 million in damages, claiming a lost business oppor-
tunity in the Grand Caymans.99
The airline moved for summary judgment on the basis of pre-
emption. However, the U.S. Magistrate Judge denied the mo-
tion, noting that the "plaintiff [was] seeking to enforce a private
agreement with the airline for transportation" and that the case
did "not involve any enlargement or enhancement based on
state laws external to that agreement" for transportation. 100
Therefore, the breach of contract claim was not preempted.
In British Airways, the same plaintiff filed suit in the same
court alleging that his brother was denied boarding on this air-
line because the fare had already been refunded.10' A district
court judge issued a decision six weeks after Vaig, reaching the
same conclusion as the magistrate judge, but with slightly differ-
ent reasoning. Unlike Magistrate Judge Collings, District Judge
Lasker held that the airline's decision to deny boarding was a
"service" of the airline and was therefore preempted from state
tort law remedies by the Act.10 2 However, the court also held
that the act of denied boarding may be able to be separated
from the airline's possible breach of a "duty to transport" the
passenger.10 3 The court held that it was premature to decide if
the contract claim could be enforced without resort to external
laws and policies. If so, it would be merely an attempt to en-
force the private agreement between these parties and, follow-
ing the Wolens decision, not preempted. 4
In Rombom v. United Airlines,10 5 the plaintiffs filed suit against
United Airlines seeking damages for defamation, emotional dis-
tress, and punitive damages. The plaintiffs alleged that they had
boarded a flight from Chicago to New York, but were treated in
a rude and aggressive manor by the flight attendants. 0 6 The
99 Vaig, 880 F. Supp. at 892.
100 Id. at 895.
101 British Airways, 889 F. Supp. at 13.
102 Id. at 14-15.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 867 F. Supp. 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
106 Id. at 216.
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airline, on the other hand, argued that the passengers were be-
having in a rambunctious and inappropriate manner and were
interfering with the flight attendants' safety instructions." 7
When the plaintiff and her companions refused to comply with
the flight attendants' requests to behave, the pilot returned the
aircraft to the gate and had the plaintiff and her companions
removed and arrested.1 0 8
The airline moved for summary judgment, claiming that
plaintiffs state tort claims were preempted. The court granted
the motion in part and distinguished between the airline's ac-
tions in deciding to return the aircraft to the gate and in decid-
ing to have the plaintiff arrested. The court held that the flight
crew's decision to transport a passenger and, by extension, the
decision to return to the gate are a "service" under section 1305
and were therefore preempted. 10 9 Similarly, plaintiffs claim for
damages based upon the rude and aggressive conduct of the
flight attendants was dismissed. However, the court permitted
plaintiffs claims for false arrest to go forward, holding that the
airline's decision to have someone arrested is not a "service" and
therefore is not subject to preemption.1 0
In Shupe v. American Airlines, Inc., 1 the passenger alleged that
airline personnel failed to provide "meet and assist" services on
a connecting flight. "The issue presented was whether the [pas-
sengers'] claims under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-
Consumer Protection Act and causes of action under theories of
negligence and breach of contract [were] preempted under fed-
eral law by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978112 (the
"Act"). ' 11 3 The district court held that all three causes of action
were preempted by the Act. On appeal, the appellate court held
that claims under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Con-
sumer Protection Act (the "DTPA") were preempted by the Act.
However, claims for breach of contract and negligence in con-
nection with the meet and assist services were not preempted.
The court noted that the parents of the passenger had paid an
additional charge above the normal ticket price for the meet
and assist service. The purpose of the Act, which prohibits states
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 223.
110 Id. at 224-25.
111 893 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. Civ. App.-[Ft. Worth] 1995, no writ).
112 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1) (1994).
11s Shupe, 893 S.W.2d at 306.
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from enforcing or enacting laws relating to air carrier rates,
routes, and services, is to prevent states from controlling the se-
lecting and design of marketing mechanisms appropriate to the
furnishing of air transportation services.114 Since the Texas
DTPA law could be used to guide and police the marketing
practices of the airline, state enforcement of that law violated
the preemption provision of the Act. Therefore, claims under
the Texas DTPA were preempted. 15 As for the breach of con-
tract claims, however, the court held that the Act is not intended
to regulate contracts between individual parties, nor is it in-
tended to shelter airlines from suits alleging a violation of an
airline's self-imposed undertakings."l 6 In addition, claims for
negligence arising from the meet and assist services would not
affect competition for airline passengers, nor would they pro-
vide state regulators with additional power over airline rates,
routes, or services." 7 Therefore, the passenger's breach of con-
tract and negligence claims were not preempted.
In State v. Metropolitan Airports Commission,"" a group of non-
profit organizations brought suit against the Minneapolis-
St. Paul International Airport, seeking to enforce state noise pol-
lution standards to the airport operations. The airport argued
that the state standards were preempted. The Supreme Court
of Minnesota agreed and found that the pervasive and extensive
scheme of federal regulation of aircraft noise evidenced an in-
tent by Congress to preempt the states in this area.19
IV. AIR CARRIER LIABILITY AND DAMAGES
A. WARSAW CONVENTION
1. Jurisdiction, Venue, and Limitations
In Sopcak v. Northern Mountain Helicopter Service,120 the plaintiffs
included the survivor and relatives of several decedents who
died in a February 7, 1990, helicopter crash. The aircraft was en
route from a mining site in British Columbia to an airport in
Alaska. At the airport, the passengers, who were all mine em-
ployees, planned to transfer to an airline flight to continue to
114 Id. at 307.
115 Id. at 308.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 520 N.W.2d 388 (Minn. 1994).
119 Id. at 391-92.
120 52 F.3d 817 (9th Cir. 1995).
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Vancouver, British Columbia. On a motion seeking dismissal
due to lack of subject matterjurisdiction, the defendants argued
that the destination of the passengers was Canada, not Alaska,
and, therefore, there was no venue under the Warsaw Treaty in
the federal courts of Alaska. 12 1 Pursuant to Article 28(1) of the
Treaty, there were four possible forums in which to bring a
cause of action:
An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the
plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,
either (1) before the court of the domicile of the carrier, or
(2) of his principal place of business, or (3) where he has a place
of business through which the contract has been made, or
(4) before the court at the place of destination. 122
The issue in Sopcak was the correct interpretation of the
phrase "place of destination." The travel arrangements in ques-
tion included flights to Alaska, with subsequent connecting
flights by a separate carrier to Canada. The accident took place
on the first leg of the flight to Alaska. Appellants brought suit in
Alaska, alleging that the city in Alaska was the "place of destina-
tion" of the helicopter that crashed. The Ninth Circuit was
called upon to resolve a question of first impression within the
Ninth Circuit as to how to determine "final destination" for pur-
poses of the Warsaw Convention when multiple carriers are
involved.
The Ninth Circuit joined the Second and Fifth Circuits in
holding that "the intention of the parties as expressed in the
contract of transportation, i.e., the ticket or other instrument,
determines the final destination." 123 When there are multiple
carriers, the total transportation provided by the carriers is con-
sidered to be one undivided trip, if regarded by the parties as
such, even if the transportation is set forth in one contract or a
series of contracts. If the parties intend the trip to be one undi-
vided trip, the separate contracts are read together and the last
ticket is the final destination. In this case, it was the employer of
the passengers who arranged the flights, and, therefore, plain-
tiffs argued there was insufficient evidence to determine
whether all parties considered the successive flights as one undi-
vided trip with a final destination in Canada. Under the facts of
this case, the court concluded that there was a sufficient basis
121 Id. at 818.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 819.
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for the trial court's conclusion that the parties intended Canada
as their final destination and therefore affirmed the dismissal. 12 4
Pasinski v. LOT Polish Airlines,12 arose out of the 1987 crash of
a LOT Polish Airlines aircraft shortly after takeoff from Warsaw,
Poland. Several passengers had round-trip tickets with a final
destination of Poland. However, they argued that they should
be entitled to relief despite the rule that the terms of the con-
tract of transportation should apply in determining final desti-
nation. The reason for this argument by the passengers from
Poland was that the government of Poland required them to
purchase round-trip tickets. However, the plaintiffs argued that
they never intended to return to Poland. The court held that
the plaintiffs should be allowed to introduce evidence at trial of
their intent to reside permanently in the United States and
never return to Poland in order to rebut the presumption that
there was any mutual consent to Poland as a final destination. 126
This is consistent with prior decisions by the same court holding
that the presumption that a ticket indicates the intended final
destination can be rebutted with evidence that there is, in fact,
no mutual consent to the final destination because the plaintiff
never intends to return or, rather, to use the return ticket.
Salamanca v. Avianca Airlines 27 involves the two-year limita-
tions period in the Warsaw Convention. The plaintiff brought
suit on January 3, 1994, to recover for a loss of property trans-
ported on an Avianca flight from New York to Columbia. Arti-
cle 29 of the Warsaw Convention provides that an action against
an international carrier must be commenced within two years
from the date of the arrival of the cargo. Avianca filed a motion
for summary judgment. The court stated that the time limit in
the Warsaw Convention is more than a statute of limitations
which may be tolled; it is a strict condition for the filing of a
lawsuit. Although the plaintiff in Salamanca had engaged in set-
tlement discussions before the limitations period ran out, the
court held that plaintiffs delay in filing was not excused, and
the suit was dismissed.
On January 6, 1995, a justice of the Ontario Canada Court of
Justice ruled in Lee v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd. 2 8 that three of
124 Id.
125 Nos. CV-89-144, CV-88-3731, CV-89-2650, 1995 WL 235219 (E.D.N.Y.
Apr. 14, 1995).
126 Id. at *4-5.
127 No. 4152-94 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Feb. 8, 1995).
128 No. 5513-85 (Ontario Ct. of Justice Jan. 6, 1995).
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five cases involving Flight 007 may proceed in the Canadian
court but that two remaining suits which involved plaintiffs who
had filed suit in Japan as well could not proceed. Korean Air
Lines had moved to dismiss or stay the five lawsuits, arguing that
the Ontario court lacked jurisdiction under Article 28 of the
Warsaw Convention, which requires an action to be brought in a
"territory" in which the defendant "has an establishment by
which the contract has been made." The Ontario court ruled
that by maintaining an office in Toronto through which the
sales of airline tickets to all of the deceased victims were ulti-
mately effected through a pyramid of agents and subagents, the
defendants provided a basis for Canadian jurisdiction. The
judge ordered a stay on the two suits in which identical actions
were proceeding in Japan. However, should it be determined
that the Japanese court does not have jurisdiction, the judge
held that the plaintiffs can pursue their action in Canada. The
judge also noted the "awkward and ambiguous" language of Ar-
ticle 28, since in improper English usage, one would not nor-
mally contemplate "an establishment by which the contract has
been made...."
2. Applicability
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention establishes three require-
ments for carrier liability: (1) an "accident" which causes
(2) physical injury, death, or physical manifestation of injury to
a passenger (3) during embarkation, disembarkation, or during
the flight itself.1 29 The issue on appeal in McCarthy v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc.13 ° was "whether plaintiff was injured while "embark-
ing" the aircraft within the meaning of Article 17. '' 131
The plaintiff had arrived late at the ticket counter in Tokyo
for a flight. The ticket agent rushed the plaintiff to the gate,
and, in the process, the plaintiff fell and was injured on an esca-
lator. The court held that the plaintiff was not in the process of
embarkation within the meaning of Article 17 because (1) she
was not close to the plane; (2) she was still in the common area
of the airport and had not taken even preliminary steps to
boarding; (3) she was a considerable distance from the depar-
ture gate; and (4) she "was not under the airline's 'control' in
129 See Martinez Hernandez v. Air France, 545 F.2d 279, 283 (1st Cir. 1976).
130 56 F.3d 313 (1st Cir. 1995).
131 Id. at 316.
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any meaningful sense.' 32 The fact that there was no cause of
action under the Warsaw Convention does not mean that the
plaintiff may be without a remedy. That is, the plaintiff could
possibly assert a common law claim against the airline for negli-
gence in rushing the plaintiff to the terminal to board an
aircraft.
The Supreme Court has defined an "accident" under Arti-
cle 17 as an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is
external to the passenger.13 3 In Craig v. Compagnie Nationale Air
France,13 4 the court declined to apply Article 17 to an incident
where a plaintiff tripped over a passenger's shoes onboard the
aircraft. The court held that it was not unexpected or unusual
to find shoes on the floor between seats on an aircraft, and,
therefore, there was no "accident" for which the carrier was
liable.'3 5
Pittman v. Grayson136 concerned the term "accident" as used in
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. The plaintiff brought suit
against an airline seeking damages for the alleged false impris-
onment of his minor daughter who was taken on a one-way in-
ternational flight from Kennedy Airport in New York to
Reykjavik, Iceland, in apparent violation of a child custody order
issued by a Florida state court. Plaintiff also sought money dam-
ages for emotional distress and interference with his custodial
rights. The defendant airline moved to dismiss the complaint
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Article 28 on
grounds of improper venue.
Article 28(1) requires the claim be brought in any of the fol-
lowing locations: (1) the domicile of the carrier; (2) the princi-
ple place of business of the carrier; (3) the place where the
contract of transportation was made; or (4) the place of destina-
tion.1 37 However, the court side-stepped the issue and found
that this action did not arise from "an accident," and, therefore,
the Warsaw Convention did not apply at all.1 38 The court held
that the state law claims were actionable.
1 3 9
132 Id. at 317-18.
133 See Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
134 45 F.3d 435, 1994 WL 711916 (9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished disposition).
135 Id. at *3.
136 869 F. Supp. 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
137 Id. at 1069.
138 Id. at 1069-71.
'39 Id. at 1074. This decision seems to fly in the face of other decisions holding
that the Warsaw Convention provides the exclusive remedy for plaintiffs suppos-
edly injured during international air travel.
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3. Damages
Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd.,1"' involved the death of
a passenger in the Soviet shoot-down of Korean Air Lines Flight
007 in the Sea ofJapan in September 1983. Consistent with pre-
vious case law, federal law applied to the plaintiffs claims. The
issue was whether the federal common law of torts was displaced
and preempted by the Death On the High Seas Act (DOHSA).
DOHSA was enacted before the United States became a signa-
tory to the Warsaw Convention. The Supreme Court has consist-
ently interpreted DOHSA as the exclusive remedy for death on
the high seas and has held that it preempts both state and fed-
eral law to the contrary. Lower federal courts had also com-
monly applied DOHSA to aviation accidents occurring on or
over the high seas. Until this decision, the Supreme Court, how-
ever, had not determined whether DOHSA applies to aviation
accidents.
When the Zicherman case was before the Second Circuit, the
court followed what is now the generally accepted rule that the
cause of action created by the Warsaw Convention is exclusive
and that federal common law decides issues concerning which
the Convention is silent, such as damages. The Second Circuit
rejected Korean Air Lines's argument that the applicable fed-
eral law is DOHSA, which limits damages to pecuniary losses."'
In making this determination, the Second Circuit reasoned that
the congressional goal of uniformity in Warsaw Convention
cases would be defeated by applying DOHSA to high seas acci-
dents and federal common law to land accidents. 142 In addition,
awarding pecuniary damages alone under DOHSA would be in-
consistent with the emphasis in Article 17 of the Warsaw Con-
vention on full compensation to victims.'43
In Alcabasa v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd.,'44 also stemming from
the Korean Airlines disaster, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit held that DOHSA applied to
a passenger death action. 45 This holding was contrary to the
Second Circuit ruling in Zicherman, but ultimately consistent
with the U.S. Supreme Court." The court of appeals rejected
140 43 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1689 (1995).
141 Id. at 22.
142 Id. at 21.
143 Id. at 21-22.
144 62 F.3d 404 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
145 Id. at 408.
146 Id. at 407.
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the plaintiffs request to "ignore DOHSA and... fashion a com-
mon law rule that would permit his suit."
1 47
The plaintiff in this case was the widower of Korean Air Lines
Flight 007 crash victim Lilia Bayona and had filed a wrongful
death suit in a District of Columbia federal court in his individ-
ual capacity in 1984. In 1985, Bayona's brother was appointed
personal representative of the estate by a New Jersey state court,
and he filed suit in a New Jersey federal district court. Korean
Air Lines agreed to a settlement with the brother, and the case
was dismissed in 1993. Korean Air Lines was granted summary
judgment in Alcabasa's suit, and the D.C. Circuit Court af-
firmed, holding that the district court had applied the wrong
law, but reached the correct conclusion. The D.C. Circuit Court
held that the husband lacked standing to file a wrongful death
suit because he had not been appointed the decedent's personal
representative. The court stated that the novel legal question
before it was not whether standing must be determined by refer-
ence to the laws of the Warsaw Convention's "contracting
states," but rather what that law is in this particular context.14
8
Korean Air Lines had argued that the question of Alcabasa's
standing was controlled by DOHSA. Under DOHSA, only the
personal representative of the decedent may bring a wrongful
death suit. The D.C. Circuit Court held that because the func-
tion of the flight-ferrying passengers across the Pacific
Ocean-was one traditionally performed by waterborne vessels
and because Alcabasa did not claim that the wrongful act that
caused his wife's death did not occur on the high seas, DOHSA
was the applicable law of the United States in this particular
case. 149 Therefore, the trial court had erred in ruling that Dis-
trict of Columbia law applied. Pursuant to the Warsaw Conven-
tion, the court held that "[w] hen courts ... determine that an
international treaty leaves a certain policy determination to
'contracting states,' they refer to the laws of the nations that are
signatories to the agreement, not the political subdivisions
thereof.", 50 "Under Article 24(2) of the Warsaw Convention, it
is the 'contracting states' [who] decide the standing ... of the
claimants .... The relevant 'contracting state' in this case is the
United States."15 The D.C. Circuit Court further noted that
147 Id.
14 Id. at 407-08.
149 Id. at 407.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 408.
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"[i]f... Alcabasa [had] not received proper compensation for
the death of [his wife], he might have a cause of action against
the personal representative, but he [could] not force the airline
to litigate a claim it had a right to believe was settled in 1993."152
The plaintiff in Rothschild v. Tower Air, Inc.153 was a passenger
on an international flight who alleges that she reached into the
magazine pouch adjacent to her seat and was stabbed in her
finger by a hypodermic needle that had been left behind earlier.
She brought suit for the physical injury of the needle prick as
well as emotional distress which she claims to have suffered due
to a fear of contracting AIDS. 154 The court held that the Warsaw
Convention does not allow damages for emotional distress and,
therefore, precluded testimony regarding plaintiffs fear of con-
tracting AIDS. The jury returned a verdict of $10,000 without
the emotional distress testimony.
Initially, the district court declined to rule on whether state or
federal law applied under the Warsaw Convention. Rather, the
court concluded that under either law, the plaintiff could re-
cover for pain and suffering resulting from being pricked by a
needle and having to undergo tests to detect AIDS and hepatitis.
However, the court held that plaintiff could not recover for the
mental anguish for AIDS phobia without proof of actual expo-
sure to the virus. 15
5
Pescatore v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.156 is another case
construing damages recoverable under the Warsaw Convention.
In this matter, the decedent was 33 years old and a vice presi-
dent with British Petroleum Chemicals of America. He had re-
ported earnings of $118,901 in 1988 and was survived by his
wife. On April 18, 1995, ajury awarded compensatory damages
of over $19 million, and the court sustained the jury's award for
loss of support, societal damages to the spouse, and prejudg-
ment interest. 157
In accord with Alcabasa, Mahalek v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd.158
was another Korean Air Lines Flight 007 lawsuit in which the
California District Court found DOHSA applied to damages and
granted Korean Air Lines's motion forjudgment as a matter of
152 Id.
153 No. 94-2656, 1995 WL 71053 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 1995).
154 Id. at *1-3.
155 Id. at *2-3.
156 887 F. Supp. 71 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
157 Id. at 72-74.
158 No. C-3:83-4381 (D. Mass. Mar. 9, 1995).
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law on the ground that the plaintiff was not dependent on his
sister for financial support and was entitled to no recovery. In
making this decision, the district court distinguished another
general maritime law case, Sutton v. Earles,159 which was a gen-
eral maritime law case that allowed a nondependent parent to
recover for societal damages on the ground that parents,
whether dependent or not, are always "common law" wrongful
death beneficiaries. However, siblings are only common law
wrongful death beneficiaries if they were dependent on the
decedent.
Ramachandran v. Thai Airways InternationalP60 arose out of the
1992 crash of a Thai Airways plane near Katmandu, Nepal, re-
sulting in the death of ninety-nine passengers and fourteen crew
members. Thai Airways had filed a motion for a determination
of applicable law. The federal district court judge ruled that
federal maritime law applied to the recoverability of damages in
this case, which was governed by the Warsaw Convention. On
the issue of which plaintiffs had standing to sue concerning the
death of the decedent, the court held that the plaintiffs would
not be limited to the representatives of the decedent's estate.
Although DOSHA and the Jones Act only allow the personal es-
tate representative to bring a wrongful death suit, the Warsaw
Convention affirmatively states that there shall be no prejudice
with regard to who brings a suit. With respect to the proper
beneficiaries, the court cited the lack of any specific language in
the Warsaw Convention and therefore applied DOHSA, the
Jones Act, and general maritime law to hold that the proper
beneficiaries were the decedent's spouse, children, parents, and
dependent relatives.
On the issue of damages, the court held that the plaintiffs
could not recover for loss of future wages because of a concern
over the possibility of a double recovery, due damages for loss of
support, inheritance, and services. The court also ruled that
plaintiffs were entitled to loss of inheritance if partial or full de-
pendency was established. The court also stated that it would
allow recovery for loss of society, but that such recovery would
be limited to spouses and dependents who must prove pecuni-
ary dependency. The court noted that the Warsaw Convention
was silent on the issue of damages and does not expressly limit
the relief available. However, actions under the Warsaw Con-
159 26 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 1994).
160 No. C-94-2644 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 1995).
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vention were found to be more analogous to deaths on the high
seas than accidents in territorial waters, and, therefore, the
court gave the provisions of DOHSA more consideration. Dam-
ages for mental anguish and grief were held to be not recover-
able in light of the fact that there exists a general prohibition of
such recovery in general maritime law and that the Warsaw Con-
vention is silent on the issue. The damages for loss of parental
care are recoverable as pecuniary losses, the court held, but they
must be limited to the period of a child's minority absent a
showing that the parent's guidance had a pecuniary value be-
yond the irreplaceable values of companionship and affection.
4. Article 25-Unlimited Compensatory Liability for Willful
Misconduct
In Pagnucco v. Pan American World Airlines, Inc.,16 a the United
States Supreme Court has denied the petition of Pan Am to re-
view lower court liability findings in the crash of Pan Am
Flight 103 at Lockerbie, Scotland. The jury in the liability trial
in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York
had found Pan Am guilty of willful misconduct, and the Second
Circuit affirmed the ruling on January 31, 1994. The Appeals
Court denied Pan Am's petition for reconsideration and issued
a revised opinion on September 12, 1994, vacating certain dam-
age awards. Pan Am again moved for reconsideration, but the
motion was denied October 28, 1994.
At the Supreme Court level, Pan Am argued that a carrier's
state of mind was the critical ingredient for a finding of willful
misconduct under Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention.
Pan Am had been precluded from presenting evidence that it
believed x-ray screening would not create a likelihood of death
or injuries, because such screening had been approved by the
FAA as complying with the Air Carriers Standard Security Pro-
gram and also with British regulations on the detection of ter-
rorists' bombs. In reply, the plaintiffs argued that the trial court
and appeals court had applied the standard definition of willful
misconduct in Warsaw cases with sufficient factual evidence to
support that finding.
Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983162 involved Korean
Air Lines Flight 007, a Boeing 747, which strayed into Soviet air
space and was shot down on September 1, 1983. All 269 persons
16, 811 F. Supp. 84 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 394 (1995).
162 No. 94-5325 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 6, 1995).
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onboard were killed, and approximately 190 wrongful death
cases were filed in various states. Korean Air Lines was found
liable for the willful misconduct of the crew, which therefore
opened the airline up for compensatory damages notwithstand-
ing the $75,000 limitation found in the Warsaw Convention.
The finding of willful misconduct was based upon the apparent
conclusion that the plane was off-course for a number of hours.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court affirmed the liability ver-
dict. The various individual cases were transferred back to their
originating districts for damages trials.
In 1993, Korean Air Lines moved to vacate the liability judg-
ment, arguing that new evidence had recently been obtained
from the Russian government by the International Civil Aviation
Organization. This included new "black box" evidence. How-
ever, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dis-
agreed and ruled that the new evidence supported the jury's
original finding. In a one-page order issued on April 6, 1995,
the District of Columbia Circuit Court affirmed that ruling, thus
permitting the damages trials to proceed undisturbed.
Under the Warsaw Convention, there is a limitation of liability
for lost or stolen goods at $9.07 per pound. The limit does not
apply if willful misconduct is proven against the carrier. The
New York district courts have held that losses due to theft by
airline employees do not constitute willful misconduct under
the Warsaw Convention.
In Uzochukwu v. Air Express International, Ltd.,163 the court held
that theft by an employee is not an act within the scope of em-
ployment, and the willful misconduct exception to limited liabil-
ity does not apply, nor has it ever applied, to employee theft.16 4
The same conclusion was reached by the court in Brinks's Ltd. v.
South African Airways.16 5
In Iyegha v. United Airlines, Inc.,16 6 David Iyegha appealed from
summary judgment entered in favor of United Airlines in
Iyegha's action alleging conversion and willful, wanton con-
duct.167 In the summer of 1991, Iyegha had purchased two air-
line tickets for himself and his two-year old daughter to travel to
Nigeria. The flights from Washington, D.C. to London's
163 No. 93-CV-5525, 1995 WL 151793 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 1995).
164 Id. at *3-4.
165 No. 94-CIV-1902(HB), 1995 WL 225602 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 1995).
166 659 So. 2d 45 (Ala. 1995).
167 Id. at 46.
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Heathrow Airport were uneventful, but upon arrival in London,
Mr. Iyegha was delayed approximately forty-five minutes to an
hour to go through immigration. When he finally picked up his
baggage, two of the suitcases had been damaged, and a signifi-
cant number of clothes were missing from the damaged cases.
The passenger attempted to show that the Warsaw Convention
liability limits of $9.07 per pound did not apply because the
damage to the luggage could only have occurred as a result of
the deliberate acts of one or more of United's employees based
upon the fact that United had exclusive possession of the lug-
gage and the damaged luggage had been set to the side of the
baggage conveyor, presumably by United employees at London
Airport. 16 However, testimony by United Airlines representa-
tives showed that the most likely explanation for the damage was
that it was caused by the baggage conveyor belts and not
through any willful misconduct on the part of the carrier. 6 9
Therefore, summary judgment in favor of United was granted.
The court held that the Warsaw Convention preempted any
state common law causes of action or remedies relating to the
damaged luggage and missing items and that its liability limita-
tions controlled the case.17 0 However, plaintiffs had also made
certain allegations that a United Airlines agent had improperly
ripped out his tickets for a flight from London to Nigeria. The
court held that United did not properly support its summary
judgment motion with respect to those allegations, and, there-
fore, the summary judgment on that claim that had been en-
tered by the lower court was reversed and remanded. 171
5. Article 26-Notice
In Aerolineas Argentinas, S.A. v. Maro Leather Co.,1 72 the United
States Supreme Court declined to review a New York Court of
Appeals ruling against Aerolineas Argentinas, S.A., which con-
tended that a New Jersey leather company did not timely notify
the airline of a cargo loss claim and should not have recovered
damages and prejudgment interest. Maro Leather Company
had received less cargo than expected and filed a written notice
of claim with the airline eight days after receiving the incom-
plete shipment. The Warsaw Convention limit on damages
168 Id. at 48.
169 Id. at 48-49.
170 Id. at 51.
171 Id.
172 648 N.E.2d 784 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1958 (1995).
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based upon the weight of the missing goods was $24,000. The
airline denied the claim, citing its standard cargo tariff and the
Warsaw Convention requirement of notice within seven days.
Aerolineas Argentinas had sought Supreme Court review, ar-
guing that state and federal courts are in conflict with courts
abroad as to the Warsaw Convention rule of notice for a partial
loss of cargo. Article 26 of the Warsaw Convention requires writ-
ten notice of claim as a condition precedent to suit based upon
"damage" to air cargo. However, this term requiring notice has
been subject to conflicting rulings in cases in which part of the
goods never arrived. In addition, Maro had been awarded
$41,182, including interest. Aerolineas Argentinas challenged
the award of prejudgment interest, arguing that it should not
have been awarded in excess of the Convention's cargo-lost
weight limitation.
B. DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
1. Handicapped Passengers/Americans with Disabilities Act
In Gottlieb v. American Airlines, Inc.,17 Daniel H. Gottlieb, a ra-
dio talk show host and clinical psychologist, brought a civil suit
against American Airlines under the Air Carrier Access Act.
Mr. Gottlieb, who is paralyzed from the chest down, claimed
that the airline failed to give cargo room priority to his electric
wheelchair on a flight from San Antonio to Philadelphia and
damaged the chair during handling. Gottlieb also contended
that the airline did not have an appropriate wheelchair to trans-
port him between his connecting flights when he landed at the
Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport (DFW) despite his ad-
vanced requests for such an accommodation. When
Mr. Gottlieb arrived in Philadelphia, his electric wheelchair was
not there, but arrived later on another flight.
The case was tried in front of a jury in the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. A verdict was returned
in March 1995, finding that the airline did not violate the fed-
eral statute with regard to the accommodations it provided to
Mr. Gottlieb during his layover at DFW, but the airline was liable
for failing to transport Mr. Gottlieb's wheelchair on the same
flight in which he was a passenger. Following the liability ver-
dict, the parties settled for a confidential amount.
173 No. CIV-A-94-4933, 1995 WL 41345 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 1995).
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In Campbell v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,174 a woman was allegedly
injured while being pushed in a wheelchair to her car after hav-
ing arrived on a Delta flight. The wheelchair attendant was an
employee of a ground handling company, International Total
Services, which was under contract with Delta. The plaintiff al-
leged that her foot was jammed against the back wall of an eleva-
tor due to the negligent handling of the wheelchair attendant.
Ajury verdict was entered for the two defendants in 1993. On
May 10, 1995, the First District California Court of Appeals af-
firmed the defense verdict and ruled that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur did not apply because the evidence failed to eliminate
causes of the injury other than the negligence of the defendant,
which is one of the required prongs of the doctrine.
2. Sex Discrimination
In Novack v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,1 75 a group of flight attend-
ants filed suit against Northwest Airlines claiming that North-
west Airlines refused to hire them as flight attendants because
they did not meet the minimum height requirement (five foot,
two inches) imposed by Northwest Airlines. 176 Flight attendants
argued that this policy had a disparate impact on women in vio-
lation of the Minnesota state statute prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of sex. The flight attendants "presented statistical
evidence showing that women were [sixty-six] times more likely
to be excluded by the height requirement than men," and the
flight attendants "also argued that Northwest's proffered busi-
ness justification of passenger safety, customer service, and re-
duced flight attendant injury failed to rationalize the resulting
discrimination.1 177 On the other hand, Northwest had numer-
ous experts testify in support of its height requirement. 178
The court held that Northwest did not violate the state law
prohibiting discriminatory business practices because it showed
that the height requirement was "manifestly related" to the
job.179 State law applicable in this case authorized an employer
to justify an otherwise discriminatory practice by showing that it
is manifestly related to the job or that it significantly furthers an
174 Aviation Litig. Rep. (Andrews Publications) 21,768 (Cal. Ct. App. May 10,
1995).
175 525 N.W.2d 592 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
176 Id. at 594.
177 Id. at 595.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 498.
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important business purpose. In this case, Northwest presented
testimony of flight attendants and medical experts and an ergo-
nomic study showing that height requirements were not only
manifestly related to the job but also furthered important busi-
ness purposes, including customer service, passenger safety and
reduced flight attendant injury. The court felt that the fact that
some flight attendants under the minimum height were able to
perform their jobs was not conclusive proof that the require-
ment was not related to the job. In addition, the fact that the
height requirement was subsequently lowered did not show that
it was not related to the job because Northwest presented evi-
dence demonstrating that the policy change came about as a
result of severe financial difficulties and the threat of impending
bankruptcy. Therefore, the lower court's finding that North-
west's requirement did not violate state law was affirmed by the
Minnesota Court of Appeals. 180
3. Age Discrimination
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. American Air-
lines, Inc.,8 the United States Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) brought a class action age discrimination
suit on behalf of pilots age forty and over who had applied and
were denied employment by American Airlines. The EEOC
charged that American Airlines's policy of hiring only pilots who
will progress to the rank of captain before age sixty (the
mandatory retirement age for airline pilots) discriminated
against applicants on the basis of age and also that American
Airlines intentionally discriminated as proved by its pattern and
practice against applicants age forty and over who were not ex-
cluded by the "years to captain" policy. The district court had
granted partial summary judgment to American Airlines on the
first claim, holding that it was barred by a collateral estoppel,
and later dismissed the second claim for insufficient statistical
evidence to create a genuine issue of disputed fact.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that American Airlines's pol-
icy of only hiring pilots who, because of age, are projected to
become captains before reaching age sixty did not violate fed-
eral age discrimination laws because the carrier's policy was rea-
sonably necessary to ensure the safest operation of its planes. 2
180 Id. at 600.
181 48 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 1995).
182 Id. at 171.
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The pilots' claims were rejected because American Airlines's hir-
ing practices had already been decided to be legitimate in an
earlier case.1 8 3 Although that earlier case had been premised on
a policy of hiring only persons over age thirty for the beginning
position of flight officer, both policies had as their purpose en-
suring that the carrier's staff of captains had the longest possible
record of experience in a carrier's cockpit. The court in the
earlier case had found that the maximization of pilot experi-
ence was reasonably necessary to the normal and safe operation
of American Airlines and that pursuant to federal law, the age-
based policy did not improperly discriminate against older pi-
lots. Since the policy of hiring only those pilots who could be-
come captain by age sixty accomplished the same purpose of
ensuring that the cockpit was staffed with the best possible ex-
perienced pilots, the pilots' claims were not materially different
from those made in the earlier case. Therefore, summary judg-
ment was properly granted in favor of American Airlines.
Stamm v. United Airlines, Inc.l"4 arose out of an age discrimina-
tion lawsuit filed against United Airlines by pilot Robert Stamm
who had unsuccessfully applied for ajob with United Airlines in
January 1992 when he was fifty-six years old and suffering from
permanent high frequency hearing loss. 1 8 5 Stamm had filed a
discrimination charge with the Colorado Civil Rights Division
(CCRD), claiming to be a victim of age and handicapped dis-
crimination.1 86 He also filed a charge with the EEOC, which de-
ferred to the CCRD for investigation of the claim. The CCRD
dismissed the charges, and Stamm subsequently filed suit in Col-
orado State Court, contending that United Airlines had violated
the state's anti-discrimination law.18 7
United Airlines subsequently successfully moved for a dismis-
sal arguing that the suit was preempted by the Airline Deregula-
tion Act of 1978.188 The EEOC subsequently notified Stamm
that they would take no action on the charges, but that he could
file a civil suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
within ninety days.'8 9 Consequently, Stamm filed suit in the
Maryland District Court, which held that the case should be dis-
183 Id.
184 No. 95-1059, 1995 WL 564360 (4th Cir. Sept. 25, 1995).




189 Id. at *2.
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missed on grounds of resjudicata since the action was barred by
the Colorado judgment.19 ° The court held that Stamm's federal
suit violated Colorado's rule against "claim-splitting," since
Stamm could have presented his federal claims along with the
state claim. 19'
The Fourth Circuit Court affirmed, holding that Colorado law
clearly provides that res judicata bars reassertion of matters that
could have been advanced in a previous action, even if the
claims are not actually asserted. 192 The Colorado state court had
jurisdiction over both of Stamm's claims, and, therefore, he was
required to bring both claims in one lawsuit or risk losing the
claim that he failed to assert. The court also noted that Stamm
failed to meet his burden to prove that the state court would
have refused to exercise jurisdiction over his federal age discrim-
ination claim.193 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit held that the
Maryland district court had properly dismissed Stamm's federal
action on the basis on the doctrine of res judicata.1'9
C. OTHER
On April 17, 1995, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit ruled in Stagl v. Delta Airlines, Inc.'95 that an airline could
be held liable for failing to supervise the conduct of individuals
at its baggage claim area. Stagl involved a seventy-seven-year-old
woman who alleged she was knocked down and injured when a
suitcase fell off a baggage carousel at New York's Laguardia Air-
port.196 The airline filed a motion for summary judgment, argu-
ing that it did not have a duty to control the crowd at the
baggage carousel.197 The Second Circuit reversed the summary
judgment that had been granted below and held that the airline
owed a duty to take reasonable steps in maintaining the safety of
its baggage claim area. 98 The case was remanded to the trial




19 Id. at *3.
194 Id. at *4.
195 52 F.3d 463 (2d Cir. 1995).
196 Id. at 465.
197 Id. at 466.
198 Id. at 472.
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In O'Hern v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,199 O'Hern, a passenger on a
Delta Airlines flight, claimed that Delta negligently caused air
pressurization changes on the subject flight which resulted in
the rupture of his right eardrum and inner ear membrane. In
support of his claim, O'Hern attempted to rely upon the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur. Delta argued that no crew member had
reported any abnormalities in the flight, and no other passen-
gers experienced ear pain or hearing loss. In addition, the air-
craft maintenance logs and records show no abnormal pressure
changes during the flight or for a period of four weeks before
and after the alleged incident.
The district court judge granted summary judgment in favor
of Delta, holding that O'Hern was attempting to rely almost ex-
clusively on the facts of his injury to support the theory of sud-
den, abnormal change in air pressure. The fact of the injury
alone is not sufficient evidence that the event occurred. With
respect to the duty to warn, the court ruled that because there
was no probative evidence that a pressure bump had occurred,
Delta could not be held liable for failing to warn passengers of a
hazardous condition that did not exist. The court also noted
that the plaintiff had stated that he often had to chew gum, swal-
low, or pop his ears on earlier flights because of changes in
cabin pressure. However, he had not informed Delta of what
could be construed as a preexisting condition and did not men-
tion to anyone on board that he was having trouble with his ears
on the flight in question.
With respect to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the court
agreed with Delta that plaintiff could not invoke the doctrine
without showing that an abnormal pressure change had actually
occurred. The court held that res ipsa loquitur was meant to al-
low a plaintiff to circumstantially establish an inference of negli-
gence, but was not meant to allow a plaintiff to circumstantially
establish the occurrence of the injury-causing event.
In Hassanein v. Avianca Airlines,20 0 the court granted summary
judgment to Avianca Airlines on the emotional distress and
property damage claims of the plaintiff, whose home was within
one hundred yards of the 1990 plane crash impact zone. 1 Mrs.
Hassanein had gone to the crash scene and assisted with rescue
work by directing emergency vehicles and allowing police to use
199 No. 93-C-5642, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7544 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 1995).
200 872 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
201 Id. at 1185.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
her home as an emergency center until the following morn-
ingY02 Mrs. Hassanein filed suit against Avianca Airlines for se-
vere psychological injuries stemming from her "own fear
associated with her rescue attempt" and her "witnessing the
human tragedy and suffering at the crash site."20 She also al-
leged that stairway damage as a result of the crash caused her to
fall and injure herself three months after the crash. Mrs. Has-
sanein's husband filed claims for loss of consortium and loss of
his wife's services as a business assistant.20 4
The court ruled that Mrs. Hassanein's rescue efforts fell short
of the qualification needed for Avianca to owe her a duty of care
under the "danger invites rescue" doctrine. 205 The court felt
that although "she may have been helpful that night, . . .her
actions appear to be more like those of a bystander, who clearly
[could] not recover under New York law."20 6 Her behavior was
voluntary and, thus, not compensable under the doctrine of
"danger invites rescue." Because plaintiff was not in the "zone
of danger" and not physically injured, "no special duty could
attach to her efforts."20 7
The plaintiffs in Tissenbaum v. Aerovias Nacionales De Columbia,
S.A.,2 08 seventy-six-year-old Samuel Tissenbaum and his seventy-
one-year-old wife Nettie, were at their home in Cove Neck, New
York, on the night of January 25, 1990, when Avianca Airlines
Flight 52 ran out of fuel and crashed in their backyard. 9
Although fire fighters secured their house from possible fire
damage, rescue workers used the house all night long asking for
various supplies, water, and use of the bathroom. The Tis-
senbaums' garage was used as a makeshift morgue. The plain-
tiffs had no electricity, telephone service, or running water,
could not leave their home for several days due to rescue vehi-
cles, and continued to have wreckage from the aircraft and sal-
vage equipment on their property for weeks. The Tissenbaums
received a settlement from their own property insurer in an
amount which they claimed did not cover all of their property
202 Id.
203 Id. at 1185-86.
204 Id. at 1186.
205 Id. at 1187-88.
206 Id. at 1188.
207 Id.
208 885 F. Supp. 434 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
209 Id. at 437.
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losses. 1° Plaintiffs brought suit against the airline seeking dam-
ages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional
trespass, and property damages.
On March 28, 1995, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York granted, in part, Avianca Airlines's motion
for summary judgment dismissing the claims for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress and intentional trespass.2 1' The
motion was denied with regard to the property damages.21 2 In
reaching its finding, Chief Judge Platt noted that a prerequisite
for liability for emotional distress to a bystander of an accident is
some type of relationship between the observers and the
tortfeasor 3 After finding that there was no relationship other
than the unfortunate coincidence of having the aircraft crash in
their backyard, Judge Platt dismissed the claims for emotional
distress. With regard to the intentional trespass claim, the court
ruled that the necessary element of "intent to invade unlawfully"
was missing inasmuch as the aircraft did not intend to either run
out of gas or crash into the Tissenbaum's yard. 4
The court let stand the Tissenbaum's claims for property
damage to the extent that those claims had not already been
resolved between Avianca Airlines and the Tissenbaums' in-
surer. 2 15 Since there was a significant amount of property dam-
age for which the insurer did not provide coverage, a release
from the insurer could not also release those aspects of the
claim. 6
In one of the two remaining aspects of the litigation stem-
ming from the July 19, 1989, crash of United Airlines Flight 232,
the state court granted summary judgment in Air Crash at Sioux
City, Iowa 17 to Titanium Metals Corporation (Timet). A similar
granting of summary judgment had been issued by the federal
court in 1991.
The damages-only trial in Shemezis v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp.2 1 1 followed defendants' agreement not to contest liability
in exchange for an agreement by all plaintiffs not to seek puni-
210 Id. at 438.
211 Id. at 442.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 438-40.
214 Id. at 44041.
215 Id. at 441-42.
216 Id. at 442.
217 No. 93-L-4325 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Apr. 5, 1995).
218 No. 94-L-13660 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Feb. 9, 1995).
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tive damages. The plaintiff in Shemezis was a forty-four-year-old
man with a wife and two children, earning approximately
$50,000 per year. The family had asked the jury to award
$3.03 million for lost income and services, $18 million for loss of
society, and unspecified millions for decedent's conscious pain
and suffering. Plaintiffs claimed that Shemezis survived the
crash, but died several minutes later from burn injuries. On the
other hand, defendants argued that Shemezis was rendered un-
conscious by the crash impact, based upon the high carbon
monoxide levels in his blood. Plaintiffs had requested that the
jury award $935,000 for lost income, $2 million for loss of soci-
ety, $25,000 for Shemezis's experiences during the 45 minutes
preceding the crash, and zero damages for post-crash conscious
pain and suffering. The jury awarded $935,000 for lost income
and services, $2.75 million for loss of society, $500,000 for
preimpact pain and suffering, and no damages for post-crash
pain and suffering.
Jackson v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 219 arose out of Trans World
Airlines (TWA) Flight 843, which ran off the runway after an
aborted takeoff at Kennedy Airport in New York in 1992. The
cases of the Jackson family went to trial on the issue of damages.
The family had been uninjured, and their damages claims were
based mainly upon emotional distress during and after the acci-
dent. The wife was awarded $25,000 in noneconomic damages,
and the husband was awarded $25,000 in noneconomic dam-
ages and $4,200 in economic damages consisting of lost wages.
The Jacksons had two children, including a nine-month-old in-
fant. Two of the children's cases were settled. The trial court
had granted a nonsuit as to the nine-month-old infant.
The state appellate court affirmed the nonsuit for nine-
month-old LeynaJackson. The court stated that although Leyna
was "capable" of suffering pain and fear during the crash, there
was no evidence she in fact suffered those emotions to the de-
gree necessary to support an award of damages in this case. The
court further stated that "a jury cannot infer that a nine-month-
old infant will suffer emotional distress in the confusion and
panic that follows an aborted landing."
The plaintiffs had also claimed damages with respect to future
air travel and changed lifestyle due to their "hastened" move
from California to Vermont following the incident. The panel
felt that plaintiffs' allegations as to future limited travel opportu-
219 No. A067382 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 1995).
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nities with respect to the infant were too conjectural, specula-
tive, and not reasonably certain to occur. As for the changed
lifestyle, the court found no evidence of any detriment to the
infant. Rather, the court found that the parents simply consid-
ered Vermont a better place to raise their children than
California.
V. GENERAL AVIATION
A. PRODUCT LIABILITY CLAIMS
Vadala v. Teledyne Industries, Inc.22° involved engine failure in a
twenty-year-old Cessna Twin. Plaintiffs sued Cessna and Tele-
dyne for negligence and breach of warranty. Teledyne won
summary judgment on grounds that plaintiffs had failed to pres-
ent evidence to support their theory of causation.221 The air-
craft had experienced a loss of oil pressure in the right engine.
Plaintiffs claimed the damper silicone on both engines had
polymerized during the flight, causing a ball bearing to fail
which, in turn, caused bolts to loosen on the right engine starter
adapter, thus compromising the oil seal.222 Teledyne argued in
response that the polymerization occurred during the fire and
would not in any event lead to ball bearing failure.223 Vadala
relied upon testimony of their expert, Roy Bourgault, who testi-
fied that the O-rings and rubber oil seal rings adjacent to the
damper showed no signs of damage from the ground fire.224
He, therefore, inferred that polymerization must have occurred
during flight, but he admitted he had no idea of what tempera-
ture would be required to alter the appearance of the O-rings
and oil seal.225
The First Circuit Court held that his admission was especially
damning because it had to be clear to the plaintiffs that fairly
persuasive testimony from the expert was needed to cope with
the inference that the right engine damper had polymerized af-
ter the crash.226 There was evidence that there had been a se-
vere post-crash fire and that the left engine damper was found
to be polymerized to approximately the same extent as the right,
220 44 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 1995).
221 Id. at 37.
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but there was no claim that it had been damaged in the flight.
The appellate court also held that Teledyne Service Bulletins
and test results presented by Bourgault did not indicate that
heat-caused damper failure was a recurrent problem and did
not support his opinion sufficiently to permit reasonable fact
finders to conclude that the damper on the aircraft had, more
probably than not, failed in flight.227
Farley v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,2 28 a product liability case, included
an allegation of enhanced injury due to the lack of shoulder
harnesses as well as product liability allegations of defective de-
sign of the fuel and stall warning systems. The aircraft involved
was a Cessna 140 built in 1946. Immediately before trial, the
court granted Cessna's motion in limine to exclude evidence of
prior accidents, finding that the plaintiff had not shown substan-
tial similarity to the crash at issue. After a three-week trial, the
jury returned a verdict for the defendant.
Frosty v. Textron, Inc. 229 was a wrongful death case against Bell
arising out of the crash of a Bell 206BIl helicopter at Mount
St. Helens. The helicopter was first sold over fifteen years prior
to the crash, and the lawsuit was filed two to three years after the
crash. Bell moved for summary judgment because Oregon had
an eight-year statute of repose for product liability actions and
because the case was filed more than two years after the acci-
dent. The plaintiff argued that the claim had been timely filed
and that the court should apply both the statute of limitations
and repose from the State of Washington, which had a three-
year statute of limitations for product liability actions and a
twelve-year statute of repose. Plaintiff submitted affidavits of a
helicopter pilot and mechanic, stating that the useful life of a
Bell 206B helicopter was in excess of fifteen years if the product
was properly maintained and inspected.
The court held that the affidavits were inadmissible under
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutica 3 ° because they provided
no information of any engineering analysis or testing required
by the FAR to determine the safe life of the helicopter or even
the fact that the affiants were capable of performing such tests.
The court also rejected plaintiff's argument that the limitations
period was governed by Washington law. Oregon's Uniform
227 Id.
228 No. 93-6948, 1995 WL 251408 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 1995).
229 No. 94-6296-TC (D. Or. May 23, 1995).
230 509 U.S. 479 (1993).
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Conflict of Law-Limitations Act provided that if a claim was sub-
stantively based upon the law of one state, the limitation period
of that state applied. Since the plaintiff had filed a claim under
Oregon law, on behalf of an Oregon claimant seeking damages
(such as punitive damages) not recoverable under Washington
law, Oregon's substantive law and limitations period applied.
Therefore, plaintiff's claims were time-barred.
In Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,231 the Supreme Court of New
Mexico issued a decision on crashworthiness issues on June 28,
1995. This case arose from an August 2, 1988, crash of a 1968
model Beech Musketeer which occurred near Cimarron, New
Mexico. Although the aircraft was equipped with seatbelts, it
was neither designed nor equipped with shoulder harnesses.
The FAA requirement for shoulder harnesses in general aviation
aircraft such as the Musketeer was not adopted until 1977 and
was applicable only to aircraft manufactured subsequent to
July 18, 1978.232 At no time did the FAA ever require retrofitting
of shoulder harnesses into aircraft that had been manufactured
before that date.2 33
The issue before the court was whether Beech's conduct was
to be measured against a negligence standard so that the reason-
ableness of its design decisions could be considered by a jury or
whether the lack of shoulder harnesses should be considered on
a product liability standard, such that the only question was
whether the design was defective even if the conduct creating
the design was reasonable.2 34 The Supreme Court of New Mex-
ico chose the latter and held that the plaintiffs may pursue de-
sign defect claims sounding in strict liability based upon the
absence of the shoulder harnesses.233 After reversing the sum-
mary judgment that had been granted by the trial court, the
Supreme Court returned the case for further proceedings.236
B. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
In Tate v. Boeing Helicopters,3 7 a case involving a death action
arising from the training mission crash of an Army helicopter in
July 1990, plaintiffs alleged that there were design flaws in the
231 902 P.2d 54 (N.M. 1995).
232 Id. at 55.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 56.
235 Id. at 64.
236 Id.
237 55 F.3d 1150 (6th Cir. 1995).
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hook and sling system, and that defendants had failed to pro-
vide adequate warnings concerning the system under Kentucky
law. 38 The court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants based upon the government contractor defense. 3 9
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment in favor of
the defendants with respect to plaintiffs' design defect claim.2 40
However, it vacated summary judgment and remanded the case
with respect to plaintiffs' failure to warn claim.2 ' In doing so,
the court concluded that the defendants' successful use of the
government contractor defense on the design claim did "not by
itself establish a defense to the plaintiffs' failure to warn
claim."242 This is because the third condition required by Boyle
v. United Technologies Corp.243 "does not encompass or state a fail-
ure to warn claim."244 The court held that the defendant had to
establish each of the three Boyle factors with respect to a failure
to warn claim. That is, the defendant had to show the following:
(1) the government exercised its discretion and approved the
defendant's warnings; (2) the contractor provided the approved
warnings; and (3) the contractor warned the government about
all dangers of which it knew.2 45 Because that particular analysis
was not conducted by the district court concerning the failure to
warn claim, the case was remanded for further analysis.
Gray v. Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Co.2 46 was a wrongful
death case arising from the crash of a Navy S-3 Viking jet aircraft
seconds after takeoff from an aircraft carrier. 47 Following a
bench trial, the court accepted plaintiff's allegation that design
defects had contributed to the accident and ruled that the de-
fendant had failed to establish the first and second prongs of
the government contractor defense: "(1) the United States ap-
proved reasonably precise specifications; [and] (2) the equip-
238 Id. at 1151.
239 Id. at 1151-52.
240 Id. at 1156.
241 Id. at 1158.
242 Id. at 1156.
243 487 U.S. 500 (1988) (wrongful death action against an independent gov-
ernment contractor in which the United States Supreme Court concluded that
suppliers of military equipment must be protected from state tort liability for
design defects under certain circumstances).
244 Tate, 55 F.3d at 1156.
245 Id. at 1153.
246 880 F. Supp. 1559 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
247 Id. at 1561-62.
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ment conformed to those specifications." 2 4 Although there was
a close working relationship between Lockheed and the Navy
during the design and creation of the S-3, the defendant failed
to establish government approval of the particular defective fea-
ture. 49 In addition, the court held that even assuming the Navy
had approved reasonably precise specifications for the defective
feature, Lockheed did not conform to those specifications.25 °
Therefore, the Boyle second element was not established, and
judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiffs.
Pack v. AC & S, Inc.251 involved a number of asbestos cases
brought by workers alleging asbestos exposure had caused vari-
ous diseases. Defendant Westinghouse wished to assert the gov-
ernment contractor defense to these state law product liability
claims because the exposure allegedly occurred while workers
were manufacturing marine turbines for the U.S. Navy.25 2 The
issue presented to the court was whether the raising of the gov-
ernment contractor defense was sufficient to create federal
question jurisdiction such that a case filed in state court could
be removed to federal court. The U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland sustained defendant's position and held
that "Westinghouse has raised a colorable claim to such a de-
fense, the validity of which should be judged by federal stan-
dards in a federal district court."25 3
Miller v. United Technologies Corp.2 54 arose out of the crash of an
F-16B jet fighter aircraft supplied to the Egyptian Government
by the United States and flown by two Egyptian airforce pilots. 255
The issue was whether the government contractor defense could
apply if the aircraft in question was purchased by the U.S. Gov-
ernment for resale to Egypt. The F-16B crashed during a train-
ing mission, killing both pilots. An investigation showed that
the main fuel pump was damaged by cavitation erosion, causing
the engine to fail. 56
Plaintiffs commenced suit against United Technologies Corp.,
Chandler-Evans, and General Dynamics, alleging improper de-
248 Id. at 1566.
249 Id.
250 Id. at 1567.
251 857 F. Supp. 26 (D. Md. 1994).
252 Id. at 27.
253 Id. at 28.
254 660 A.2d 810 (Conn. 1995).
255 Id. at 814-15.
256 Id. at 815.
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sign, manufacture, and assembly of the fuel pump, as well as
failure to warn of the dangers of the pump.2 57 Defendants
claimed that the pilots' deaths were caused by their failure to
properly execute a flameout landing and by their failure to initi-
ate the ejection sequence in a timely manner. The contractors
also contended that the government contractor defense
shielded them from liability. The trial court granted the con-
tractors' summary judgment motion based upon the govern-
ment contractor defense set forth in Boyle.2 5 Plaintiffs appealed
to the state appellate court, and the case was transferred to the
Connecticut Supreme Court. Plaintiffs argued that the trial
court had improperly applied the government contractor de-
fense because the aircraft was purchased by the U.S. Govern-
ment for resale to the Egyptian Government. Plaintiffs also
claimed that the contractors did not meet the Boyle require-
ments and that the court incorrectly held that the government
contractor defense precluded plaintiffs' failure to warn claim.259
The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the Boyle defense
applies regardless of what the government intends to do with
the military equipment.260 The court also stated that 'Judicial
inquiry into the United States government's intended use or dis-
position of military equipment would be an improper intrusion
into the discretion of the executive and legislative branches of
the federal government."261 In addition, "if the defense applied
only to contracts for equipment designated for use directly and
exclusively by the United States government, contractors
[could] . . . refuse to manufacture products according to the
government's specifications." 26 2 However, the court did find
that there were issues of material fact requiring a remand to the
trial court for further deliberation. Furthermore, contrary to
the Sixth Circuit's holding in Tate, the Connecticut Supreme
Court held that the government contractor defense does pre-
clude failure to warn claims as a matter of law.2 63
Anzalone v. Westech Gear Corp.264 involved a civilian employee of
the United States Navy who was injured while aboard a Navy
257 Id.
258 Id. at 816.
259 Id. at 818.
260 Id.
261 Id. at 820.
262 Id. at 821.
263 Id. at 837.
2r- 661 A.2d 796 (NJ. 1995).
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ship. The plaintiff was using a component of a fuel replenish-
ment system which was allegedly defective due to a lack of a
safety device.2 65 The mid-level appellate court in NewJersey re-
versed the trial court's granting of a government contractor mo-
tion for summary judgment, holding that the government
specifications were silent with respect to safety devices, thus fail-
ing to fulfill one of the requirements of this defense under the
Boyle case.2 66
In Allison v. Merck & Co.,267 the Nevada state court was faced
with an opportunity to expand the government contractor de-
fense to a nonmilitary situation. Although the Seventh Circuit
had done so in Boruski v. United States,161 the court in this case
declined to do so. The product was a vaccine which allegedly
caused a child to become blind, deaf, and mentally retarded. 9
The Nevada Supreme Court fell short of totally rejecting the
government contractor defense to a nonmilitary situation, but
nevertheless found that "[t]his defense is very ill-defined" and
was inapplicable to a case where the government failed to pro-
vide "precise designs and specifications." 270
In Timberline Air Service, Inc. v. Bell Helicopter-Textron, Inc.,27 1 a
civilian logging operation purchased a used military helicopter
which was subsequently involved in a crash. Plaintiffs alleged
that the crash was caused by the failure of a pinion gear which
was critical to control the tail rotor. Bell had previously pro-
vided warnings to purchasers of the civilian model of this heli-
copter, but did not forward those warnings to purchasers of the
models that were originally manufactured for the military. The
trial court had granted Bell's motion under the government
contractor defense, but was reversed by the Washington
Supreme Court.272
C. ECONOMIC Loss DOCTRINE
American Eagle Insurance Co. v. United Technologies Corp.2 73 arose
out of the 1987 crash of a Cessna Caravan. There were no per-
265 Id. at 797.
266 Id. at 805.
267 878 P.2d 948 (Nev. 1994).
268 803 F.2d 1421 (7th Cir. 1986).
269 Id. at 951.
270 Id. at 959-60.
271 884 P.2d 920 (Wash. 1994).
272 Id. at 934.
273 48 F.3d 142 (5th Cir.), reh'g granted in part, 51 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 1995).
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sonal injuries; however, Martinaire, Inc. (the plane's owner) and
American Eagle Insurance Company were legally responsible for
damage to the aircraft and ground property. Pratt & Whitney-
Canada, Ltd. (P&WC) manufactured and sold the aircraft's PT-6
engine to Cessna in 1985. Martinaire and American Eagle had
filed suit in federal court, and all claims were dismissed.274
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's holding that Texas
law does not permit recovery under a negligence theory for eco-
nomic loss resulting from damage to a defective product. 275 In
addition, "strict tort liability [is] not... applied when economic
loss alone [is] asserted."276 The court also found that there was
no evidence supporting the appellate's argument that the par-
ties bargained separately for individual components of the air-
craft. Therefore, the aircraft hull did "not qualify as 'other
property' damaged by the defective engine component."277 The
court held that the damage to ground property, since it was suf-
fered by a third party, did not qualify Martinaire or American
Eagle for strict liability recovery.2 78 This was based upon the
1978 Texas Supreme Court ruling in Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Uni-
versal Oil ProductS2 79: "One who sells any product in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or
to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property
"280
The court initially reversed summary judgment, however, for
P&WC on the breach of implied warranty claims, holding that
summary judgment was inappropriate because the trial court
did not evaluate the effectiveness of defendants' written dis-
claimer of implied warranties .28  However, upon rehearing, the
court concluded that there was a sufficient basis for the trial to
rule on this issue and that the disclaimer was "conspicuous" so
as to fulfill the requirement under the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices Act.282 The rehearing, combined with the original rul-
ing, resulted in a full affirmance of the trial court.285
274 Id. at 144.
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 Id. at 145.
278 Id.
279 572 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1978).
280 Id. at 325 (emphasis in original).
281 Id. at 147.
282 American Eagle Ins. Co., 51 F.3d at 469.
283 Id.
19961
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
284Trans States Airlines v. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc., a case
arising under Illinois law, was brought to recover personal in-
jury, property damage, loss of revenue, and repair costs stem-
ming from the failure of a Pratt & Whitney engine which led to
an inflight fire and emergency landing. In applying the eco-
nomic loss doctrine as enunciated in Illinois by the case of Moor-
man Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co.,28 5 the court drew a
distinction between sudden malfunctions as opposed to those
which occur from a gradual deterioration. 86 The Moorman case
permits broad tort law recovery for the former, but not the lat-
ter. In this case, the court held that there was sufficient evi-
dence for the jury to consider whether the occurrence was
"sudden" or "gradual. 2 87
In Bocre Leasing Corp. v. General Motors Corp.,288 the New York
Court of Appeals barred tort recovery of economic damages
caused by a defective product purchased in a commercial trans-
action. 28 9 This was a helicopter crash case against Allison Gas
Turbine Division of General Motors Corporation. The majority
of the New York Court of Appeals held that "[t] ort recovery in
strict products liability and negligence against a manufacturer
should not be available to a downstream purchaser where the
claimed losses flow from damage to the property that is the sub-
ject of the contract. ' 290 The question had been certified to the
New York Court by the Second Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals.
The Bell helicopter in question was manufactured in 1972 with
an Allison engine and had been sold to a used aircraft broker in
1986. Bocre Leasing then bought it for $214,000 "as is." As a
result of a crash in 1989, there was minor damage to the heli-
copter. However, further damage resulted when the aircraft was
being transported by truck to Bocre's hangar. Bocre received
$371,000 in insurance payments and sued GM for $450,000 in
lost profits and repair costs. The majority of the New York
Court of Appeals noted that Bocre could have protected itself by
negotiating a seller's warranty with the used aircraft broker
under the Uniform Commercial Code. 91  Since Bocre
284 875 F. Supp. 522 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
285 435 N.E.2d 443 (Ill. 1982).
286 Trans States Airlines, 875 F. Supp. at 525.
287 Id.
288 645 N.E.2d 1195 (N.Y. 1995).
289 Id. at 1199.
290 Id.
291 Id. at 1197.
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purchased the helicopter in "as is" condition, plaintiff assumed
the risk of loss.2 92
In Palau International Traders, Inc. v. Narcam Aircraft, Inc.,293
plaintiff Palau International Traders purchased an aircraft from
defendant International Airlines Holdings Corp., which it in-
tended to use for hauling cargo for its own commercial pur-
poses. 94 Six months after Palau took delivery, corrosion cracks
were discovered in the landing gear, and Palau sued the mainte-
nance company that had certified the aircraft as airworthy prior
to purchase. 95 Palau sought damages for the repair costs, loss
of use, and consequential damages. On March 15, 1995, the
Third District Florida Court of Appeals ruled that state law bars
tort recovery when a product damages itself and causes eco-
nomic loss without personal injury or damage to property other
than the product itself.296 "[A]lthough the buyer's expectations
of the airplane were not met, any damages could have been
remedied if the buyer had purchased insurance, paid for a war-
ranty, or directly contracted with the airplane mechanic." 297
The court also stated that "[t] o expand negligence laws under
the facts of this case would result in providing the buyer with a
remedy against Narcam without consideration, that is of longer
duration and greater financial impact than the remedy the
buyer contracted for with the seller in the first place. '298 This
"would be contrary to the well established policy of limiting re-
covery in contract actions to damages which were within the
contemplation of the parties. 299
Checkers Drive-In Restaurants, Inc. v. Ryder Airline Services, Inc.3"'
is in accord with Palau. Plaintiff had purchased a used Cessna
Citation which it claimed had been negligently serviced in 1988
by the defendants. The plaintiff took ownership of the aircraft
in 1992 and claimed that substantial overhaul work had to be
performed in 1994 due to the negligent maintenance of six
years earlier. The plaintiff tried to avoid the economic loss doc-
trine, which had been enunciated in the Pennsylvania case of
292 Id.
293 653 So. 2d 412 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995).
294 Id. at 413.
295 Id.
296 Id. at 418.
297 Id. at 416.
298 Id.
2%Id.
00 No. 94-SU-05372-01 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995).
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REM Coal Co. v. Clark Equipment Co.30 by claiming that the main-
tenance was a substandard service, not a defective product. The
court was unpersuaded and reiterated the law in Pennsylvania
that a defendant cannot be liable for purely economic damages
in cases where products damage themselves as the result of de-
fects and cause no personal injury or damage to other property.
D. AGENCY AND VICARIous LIABILITY
Huddleston v. Union Rural Electric Ass'n302 was filed by the sur-
viving minor children of a victim of a 1987 crash of a single en-
gine plane in the mountains near Nucla, Colorado."'3 The
plaintiffs attempted to establish the vicarious liability of the
Union Rural Electric Association for the negligence of the pilot
even though the pilot was an independent contractor and not
an employee of the Association. Plaintiffs argued that the gen-
eral rule of nonliability for an employer of an independent con-
tractor was inapplicable in a situation involving an "inherently
dangerous" activity and that this determination should be left to
the jury. °4 The original jury verdict in 1991 found in favor of
the plaintiffs on this issue. The verdict was reversed by the Colo-
rado Court of Appeals, but again reversed and remanded by the
Colorado Supreme Court.30 5 During the retrial, the court, once
again, permitted the jury to determine whether the activity was
"inherently dangerous" and thus circumvent the usual rule of
nonliability for an independent contractor, and, once again, the
jury found in favor of the plaintiffs.3 0 6 On April 6, 1995, the
Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court to permit the jury to rule on this issue. 0 7
Estate of Dean v. Air Exec, Inc. 08 dealt with the issue of whether
an aircraft owner was vicariously liable to a co-employee of the
pilot whose negligence caused the crash.3 0 9 The subject crash of
a Cessna 172 took place on August 6, 1991, when the pilot and
his co-employee were directed by their common employer to fly
to another city to pick up another employee and continue on to
301 563 A.2d 128 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
302 897 P.2d 865 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).




307 Id. at 868.
308 534 N.W.2d 103 (Iowa 1995).
wo9 Id. at 103-04.
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Kansas City. The plane crashed on approach, killing both occu-
pants. The co-employee's estate filed suit, alleging that the pi-
lot's negligence caused the crash and that their common
employer, Air Exec, was liable for the negligence of the lessee. 10
Air Exec filed for summary judgment, arguing that absent gross
negligence, the co-employee immunity granted to the lessee
under the state's worker's compensation laws should also cover
parties vicariously liable for the co-employee's negligence. The
trial court denied Air Exec's summary judgment motion.3"
On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court held that the worker's
compensation remedy is only exclusive as to claims against the
injured party's employer or co-employees who are not grossly
negligent.31 2 The court held that the Act does not provide im-
munity to third parties.3 1 3 In addition, because the immunity
provided to employers and co-employees is based upon a quid
pro quo not applicable to parties in the position of Air Exec,
there was no basis for implying a similar immunity on their
behalf.314
The court also held that the aircraft owner's liability statute
applied in the case, and the question to be determined was
whether there was any indication that the broadly stated liability
which that statute imposes turns on the negligence of the opera-
tor or the liability of the operator.315 The court concluded that
it turned on the negligence of the operator 16 In making its
decision, the Iowa Supreme Court stated that the 1944 Califor-
nia Supreme Court ruling in Baugh v. Rogers317 was on point.3 1 8
The Baugh decision had held that the special defense of the neg-
ligent operator, based on the business relationship and the sta-
tus of the operator and the plaintiff, as well as the provisions of
the worker's compensation law, is not available to the owner.3 19
It is the negligence of the operator, and not his liability or sta-
tus, which is imputed to the owner.3 20
310 Id. at 104.
31 Id.
312 Id. at 106.




317 148 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1944).
318 Estate of Dean, 534 N.W.2d at 105.
319 Id. (citing Baugh, 148 P.2d at 640-41 (citations omitted)).
320 Id.
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E. WAIVER AND RELEASE FROM LIABILrY
In Johnson v. Paraplane Corp.,321 the owner of the aircraft, seek-
ing damages for injuries, commenced a negligent design defect
claim against Paraplane Corporation, the manufacturers of an
Ultralight aircraft in which he was injured.2 2 Prior to the flight,
he had signed a waiver and release, as well as viewed a video tape
which explained the waiver in detail.32 3 Paraplane had filed a
summary judgment motion, arguing that the circuit court
lacked jurisdiction because of a forum selection clause in the
waiver, which specified that any lawsuit be filed in New Jersey
state court.3 24 On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals
held that the liability release signed by the plaintiff barred him
from pursuing the design defect claims alleged.3 2 The appeals
court held that this was true even though the waiver did not
contain a phrase specifically for "negligent design."3 26 The
waiver was, however, broad enough to release Paraplane from all
liability, since it stated that "[t]he waiver cover[ed] hidden, la-
tent, or obvious defects in the equipment."3 27 The court found
that negligent design defects are one type of defect, whether
they are hidden, latent, or obvious.328 Therefore, the court held
that "defects arising from the negligent design of the equipment
clearly come within the exclusion, as would design defects based
on strict liability or warranty theories. "329
F. OTHER
In Joyce v. Boeing Helicopter Co.,33° Boeing Helicopter Company
agreed to pay a total of $2 million to settle lawsuits filed in the
1992 crash of an experimental V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft.
The lawsuits had been filed after U.S. Marine Master Gunnery
Sergeant Gary Leader and Gunnery Sergeant Shawn Joyce died
as a result of the crash. The aircraft had crashed as it was con-
verting from wing to helicopter mode flight entering the traffic
pattern at Quantico Marine Corps Airstrip Station. Plaintiffs
321 460 S.E.2d 398 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995).
322 Id. at 399.
323 Id.
324 Id.





330 No. H-94-2603 (S.D. Tex., Dec. 16, 1994).
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contended in their complaint that the crash was caused by the
negligence of Boeing, which was responsible for the mainte-
nance of the aircraft, in failing to properly install a seal in the
right nacelle. Plaintiffs also contended that the Boeing pilot was
grossly negligent by failing to land immediately upon illumina-
tion of caution and warning lights prior to the scheduled stop at
Charlotte, North Carolina. Plaintiffs further allege that if the
pilot had made the interim stop at Charlotte as scheduled, the
leak in the nacelle would have been discovered.
VI. AIRPORTS AND FIXED BASE OPERATORS
In Norris v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,331 the plaintiffs were the repre-
sentatives of those killed when a Cessna 177 Cardinal crashed in
September 1992. The corporate owner of the airport as well as
the airport manager were named as defendants on a theory of
vicarious liability, with the plaintiffs claiming that they could be
held liable for the actions of the pilot who rented the aircraft
from them. It was alleged that the pilot misfueled the aircraft,
parked it on a slope, allowing fuel to leak out, and failed to per-
form an adequate preflight inspection. On April 26, 1995, sum-
mary judgment was granted in favor of the airport owner and
manager. The court held that the manager of the airfield had
no authority with respect to the operation of the plane flown by
the pilot and that the airport could not be held liable for the
misconduct of the independent contractor pilot.
The issue in Bostrom v. County of San Bernardino312 was whether
the County could be held liable for the actions of an employee
of the airport lessee where the county owned the airport. Like
Norris, these allegations concerned a misfueling, but this time by
the lessee's employee. The Fourth District of the California
Court of Appeals ruled that the County of San Bernardino could
not be liable for failing to enforce FAA fueling recommenda-
tions, for negligent selection and hiring of the lessee, or for fail-
ing to properly supervise the lineman who performed the
fueling.333
331 Aviation Litig. Rep. (Andrews Publications) 21,677 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 26,
1995).
332 42 Cal. Rptr.2d 669 (Cal. CL App. 1995).
s3s Id. at 676.
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VII. INSURANCE COVERAGE
In U.S. Aviation Undenrriters, Inc. v. Fitchburg-Leominster Flying
Club, Inc.,3 4 the United States Supreme Court declined to re-
view a First Circuit ruling that a woman injured when she walked
into a spinning propeller after disembarking from an aircraft
was a "passenger" under the terms of an insurance policy issued
by United States Aviation Underwriters (USAU). The plaintiff
had been struck by the propeller of a single engine Cessna after
she got off the plane at Toronto International Airport. The in-
surance coverage on the aircraft was for one million dollars with
a per-passenger limit of one hundred thousand dollars. USAU
commenced a declaratory judgment action to determine
whether Deborah Crocker's status as a passenger continued to
the time of her injury. The district court had held that passen-
ger status continues until the person reaches a zone of safety,
particularly where the person is still engaged in an activity asso-
ciated with the flight. In this case, Deborah Crocker was on her
way to obtain aircraft parking information. The First Circuit
agreed with the district court judge that passenger status contin-
ues until a person reaches a "zone of safety."
Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Thien,1 5 was a coverage dispute
case involving a fatal 1989 plane crash. The aircraft had been
owned by Mid-Planis Corp. and resulted in the death of the pilot
and an employee, Charles Benedict. Benedict's family filed suit
in state court against Mid-Planis, its director of operations
(Michael Thien), and Richard Lund (defendant ad litem). Fire-
man's Fund, who was Mid-Planis's insurer, denied coverage to
Thien and Lund because Benedict was a Mid-Planis employee
falling within an exclusionary clause of the policy. 3 6 Fireman's
Fund then filed a declaratory judgment action arguing that the
exclusionary clause applied to liability coverage of Thien and
Lund for Benedict's death.33 7 Under the terms of the exclusion
in the policy, Thien and Lund were not covered if Benedict was
a Mid-Planis employee at the time of the crash acting within the
scope of his employment.
The district court granted Fireman's Fund summary judg-
ment. However, the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that an is-
sue of material fact existed as to whether Benedict was acting
3-- No. 94-1741 (U.S. May 22, 1995).
335 63 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 1995).
336 Id. at 756.
337 Id.
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within the scope of his employment at the time of the crash. A
district court jury found for the insurance company and the
Benedicts again appealed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the jury
award, rejecting the Benedicts' argument that payroll records
offered into evidence to prove that Benedict was a Mid-Planis
employee when the plane crashed were not admissible under
the business records exception to the hearsay rule."'8 The Bene-
dicts also argued that the trial judge had erred in excluding FAA
reports that Thien did not accurately perform his duties as pilot
log bookkeeper and had falsified certain entries. The Benedicts
argued that this evidence cast doubt on the veracity of the pay-
roll records.3 3 9
However, the Eighth Circuit held that the FAA reports were of
only marginal probative value and their attenuated relevance
was not sufficient to outweigh unfair prejudice, confusion, and
the waste of time that would result from the admission of those
documents.34° The Eighth Circuit also held that admission of
certain evidence to show the untrustworthiness of Mid-Planis's
recordkeeping would violate Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b) .341 Furthermore, although allegations that Thien falsi-
fied logs may be probative of his truthfulness, the decision to
admit the evidence on cross-exam was within the trial court's
discretion and subject to the limitations of Federal Rule of
Evidence 403.42
North American Specialty Insurance Co. v. Litco Brokers, Inc.343
arose out of the November 1992 crash of a Cessna 177B in West
Virginia which resulted in the death of the pilot and his two
passengers. The pilot possessed a student pilot certificate, but
he had never achieved a private pilot's certificate. The estate of
the deceased passenger filed a wrongful death action against the
pilot's estate alleging that he was negligent in the operation of
the aircraft. The pilot's estate tendered the defense of the case
to its insurer, North American Specialty Insurance Company.
North American filed a declaratory judgment action alleging
that the policy did not provide coverage because it specifically
required at least a private pilot's certificate for the carrying of
passengers. The estates of the pilot and the deceased passen-
ss8 Id. at 757-58.
s31 Id. at 758-59.
so Id. at 759.
341 Id. at 760.
342 Id.
343 No. 93-119 (E.D. Kan. Mar. 27, 1995).
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gers argued that the policy failed to define "private pilot certifi-
cate" and "student pilot certificate," thus creating an ambiguity
in the policy. Therefore, they argued, the pilot's expectation of
coverage for the occurrence was reasonable. The court granted
North American's motion for summary judgment, holding that
the policy language was not ambiguous.
In North American Specialty Insurance Co. v. Myers,344 John My-
ers, who was the named insured under an aviation liability policy
issued by North American Specialty Insurance Company (NAS),
was killed in the crash of a Piper PA-24-180 on December 19,
1992, along with flight instructor Arthur Huffman. NAS filed a
declaratory judgment action arguing that it had no duty to de-
fend or indemnify the flight instructor's estate against the
wrongful death claim filed by Myers's estate. The Eastern Dis-
trict of Michigan granted partial summary judgment to NAS,
holding that Huffman was working as an independent flight in-
structor at the time of the crash and that the flight instructors
were clearly excluded from the class of insureds under the pol-
icy. The court also noted that the policy excluded coverage for
bodily injury to any named insured, including the pilot. An-
other issue dealt with by the court was the fact that physical de-
livery of the policy to the insured occurred after the accident.
The court held that the "delay" in issuing the policy did not pre-
clude its application.
Insurance Co. of North America v. American Eagle Insurance Co.,3 45
arose out of a declaratory judgment action concerning a 1991
crash of a Piper PA-24-250. Owner William Jaeck amended his
American Eagle Insurance Policy to cover a three-day period in
which his wife, Nancy, was onboard the aircraft for a "flying
companion-pinch hitter course" at Portage County Airport.
The course had been designed to train nonpilots in the han-
dling of aircraft during emergencies. Jaeck's wife was killed as
well as the pilot. Jaeck filed a proof of claim with American Ea-
gle, who paid $29,734 for loss of the aircraft, although it found
that the pilot had no flying experience in that particular Piper
model. Jaeck then filed suit in Ohio state court, seeking
$1.2 million in damages for his wife's emotional distress, her
death, and his loss of consortium. Jaeck sued the 99's (an inter-
national organization of women pilots), the Lake Erie 99's, the
organizer of the pinch-hitter course, the FBO at Portage County
3- No. 94-CV-10114-BC (E.D. Mich. Aug. 18, 1995).
35 No. 94-P-0115 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
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Airport, and the executrix of the pilot's estate. Insurance Co. of
North American (INA) was the insurance carrier for the 99's
and the Lake Erie 99's, which acted as primary insurer in de-
fending the complaint. INA attempted to tender this defense to
American Eagle based upon the company's certificate of insur-
ance and payment to Jaeck for physical damage to the aircraft.
However, American Eagle did not respond to the defense
tender, and INA continued to provide a defense. Subsequently,
INA filed a declaratory judgment action against American Eagle,
claiming that it owed a primary and underlying duty to defend
and indemnify defendants in the wrongful death action. In re-
sponse, American Eagle argued that INA was the insurer for any
loss over the one million dollars in underlying coverage pro-
vided by American Eagle. The two actions were consolidated,
and INA was granted summary judgment. Ajury awardedJaeck
$612,434.
On appeal, the Ohio Court of Appeals ruled that American
Eagle had no duty to defend and, therefore, reversed summary
judgment for INA. The court held that the policy did not pro-
vide coverage for any person or organization that provides avia-
tion instruction, pilot, or flight services where an occurrence
arises out of those activities. In addition, the appellate court dis-
agreed with the trial court's ruling that American Eagle's pay-
ment on the property loss claim to Jaeck constituted a waiver of
its right to deny coverage under the policy. The court held that
a court cannot create a new contract for the parties to extend
coverage beyond the scope the insurer intended to cover or for
which the insurer did not charge a premium.
VIII. U.S. GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY
AND DEFENSES
A. DIscRETIoNARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION
Black Hills Aviation, Inc. v. United States46 arose from the crash
of a civilian Lockheed P2V Neptune firefighting aircraft on the
White Sands Missile Range in White Sands, New Mexico.3 47 The
plaintiffs claimed that the United States shot down this aircraft,
failed to properly investigate the accident, and tortiously inter-
fered with their investigation by denying them access to the
crash site and by not preserving the wreckage. 348 The United
w 34 F.3d 968 (10th Cir. 1994).
347 Id. at 969.
3Q Id. at 970.
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States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the deci-
sion of the trial court that the various actions taken by the
United States Army concerning the investigation were policy
judgments protected by the discretionary function exception
and that there was no evidence the Army was responsible for the
removal of airplane parts or for the crash. 49
AIG Aviation Insurance Services, Inc. v. United States350 arose
when a Bell 206 helicopter struck an unmarked power line ap-
proximately thirty feet above the ground and then crashed while
hovering over a taxiway at the Brigham City Airport.3 5 1 The op-
erator of the helicopter and its insurer filed suit against the
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for loss
of use and the resulting hull damage to the helicopter, alleging
that the FAA was negligent in failing to report the power lines as
an obstacle after airport inspections and that airport owner Brig-
ham City was negligent for allowing the obstruction to exist.352
"[P]laintiffs argued that the FAA violated FAA Airport Safety
Data Program Order 5010.4... [which] instructs FAA inspec-
tors ... to [I] ook for and report all items from the airport that
could be hazardous, such as unmarked obstructions . . . and
other safety hazards on or near the runway."353
The court granted motions to dismiss both claims based upon
the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. The district
court held that the United States was entitled to dismissal be-
cause the decisions of the FAA inspectors were judgment calls
based upon the discretion vested in the agency by the relevant
regulatory schemes.s The court cited United States v. Varig Air-
lines, 55 for the proposition that "[t] he FAA has a statutory duty
to promote safety in air transportation, not to insure it."3 5 6
With respect to Brigham City's motion for summary judg-
ment, like the FTCA, the Utah Governmental Immunity Act has
a discretionary function exception. The court held that the
City's operation of the airport fell within the discretionary func-
tion section of the Act. 57
349 Id. at 975-78.
350 885 F. Supp. 1496 (D. Utah 1995).
351 Id. at 1497.
352 Id. at 1497-98.
3-3 Id. at 1498-99 (citations omitted).
354 Id. at 1500.
355 467 U.S. 797 (1984).
356 AIG Aviation, 885 F. Supp. at 1502 n.5 (citing Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 821).
357 Id. at 1502-04.
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B. AIR TRnic CONTROL NEGLIGENCE
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. United States358 involved consolidated
cases arising from the crash of a twin engine Beech Baron air-
craft into a crowded shopping mall in Concorde, California, on
December 23, 1985 . 9 The aircraft's pilot attempted a night-
time missed approach from nearby Concorde Airport. During
the approach, the pilot apparently became disoriented and lost
control of the aircraft. There were seven deaths and seventy
ground injury victims, including serious burn injury cases. Dam-
ages in the cases were estimated to be in the range of thirty-five
to forty million dollars.
The trial court held that there was no negligence on the part
of air traffic controllers at the airport in Concorde contributing
to the crash.36 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment en-
tered in favor of the defendant by the district court.361 In doing
so, the Ninth Circuit found that there was ample evidence to
support the district court's finding that the controller's brief
glimpse of the aircraft did not show it off the normal flight
path. 62 The evidence established that after the controller saw
the aircraft and communicated to the pilot the correct proce-
dure for a missed approach, their duty was fulfilled. They had
no reason to expect that the pilot would execute an improper
approach. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had estab-
lished neither breach of duty nor proximate causation. Plain-
tiffs "cannot recover if there is a mere possibility that
defendant's actions caused the wrong."363
Thurston v. United States364 arose out of a 1993 accident in
which a single engine Stinson aircraft collided with a mountain-
ous terrain near Salt Lake City, Utah. The pilot and sole occu-
pant of the aircraft was killed, and his widow and three children
sued for wrongful death under the FTCA, alleging that the air
traffic controllers at the Salt Lake City Airport contributed to
the cause of the accident.
The pilot was licensed and qualified for flight only in visual
meteorological conditions.3 6  He encountered inclement
358 51 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 1995).
359 Id. at 836.
360 Id. at 838.
36, Id. at 842.
362 Id. at 839.
363 Id. at 838.
3M4 888 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Utah 1995).
N Id. at 1102, 1106.
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weather during a mid-day flight, but did not declare an emer-
gency.3 66 Rather, he radioed controllers with a series of requests
for "vectors," repeatedly stating that he could not see objects on
the ground. 67 By the time the controllers realized that the
flight was in need of emergency assistance, the plane was less
than thirty seconds from ground impact.3 68 The controllers had
radioed a suggested heading. However, the pilot did not com-
mence a turn promptly, and the accident resulted.
At the end of the liability case, after the court heard testimony
from thirteen witnesses and visited the Salt Lake City radar facil-
ity, the court ruled that the air traffic controllers had acted rea-
sonably.3 69 The court noted that the controllers are not
omniscient and must rely upon the pilot's reports in order to
know what is going on in the airplane. The pilot's request for
vectors and his response to air traffic controller questions did
not indicate an emergency situation.3 70 The pilot failed to com-
municate his emergency situation until the last moment, and
there was no basis for the air traffic controllers to realize that he
was in peril and in need of additional services. 7 1 Therefore, the
court found no negligence by the air traffic controllers since
they had given the pilot reasonable guidance based upon their
understanding of his situation.
In Paquette v. United States,3 72 after a five-day trial, the district
court rendered a bench decision in favor of the United States
on a case involving the crash of a Cessna 182. The aircraft had
encountered severe "mountain wave" turbulence and crashed in
the Sierra Nevada mountains. The plaintiffs claimed that the air
traffic controllers failed to properly brief the pilot concerning
the possibility of the turbulence and negligently vectored the
pilot so as to become fatally caught in this atmospheric problem.
The court held that there was no negligence proven on the part
of the FAA personnel and that the sole proximate cause of the
accident was the pilot's negligence.
In Giraldo v. United States,373 U.S. District Judge Thomas C.
Platt ordered the United States to pay $1.2 million in damages
366 Id. at 1103, 1105.
367 Id. at 1103.
368 Id. at 1105.
369 Id. at 1110.
370 Id.
371 Id.
372 No. 92-3516KN (JRX) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 1995).
373 No. CV-91-0133-TCP (E.D.N.Y. July 7, 1995).
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to plaintiff Mauricio Giraldo who had been injured in the crash
of Avianca Airlines at Cove Neck, New York. Giraldo had been
trapped in the wreckage for several minutes and was not taken
to a hospital until nearly four hours later. He suffered signifi-
cant injuries that required eight operations and also suffered
from post-traumatic stress disorder. Giraldo's suit against Avi-
anca had been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under the War-
saw Convention. This left the United States as the sole
defendant with respect to a Federal Tort Claims Act suit in con-
nection with plaintiffs claim that the crash was due to the negli-
gence of air traffic controllers.
The government did not contest liability. In fact, a nonjury
damages trial commenced in February 1995. With respect to
damages, the United States had argued that the plaintiff was a
Columbian domiciliary at the time of the crash and that, there-
fore, the court should consider Columbian monetary factors in
calculating the damages.
Judge Platt, however, found that the plaintiff was a New York
domiciliary when the plane went down and that he remained
domiciled in that state. "The physical presence requirement for
the purpose of domicile is met as his injuries were sustained
while he was physically present in New York. This requirement
is met regardless of the fact that Mr. Giraldo's injuries occurred
at the same time as his uncomfortable arrival in New York." Ac-
cordingly, Judge Platt based plaintiff's damages awards upon the
U.S. Life Expectancy Tables and Economic Conditions, award-
ing damages of $297,960 for future medical care, $417,000 for
diminution of future earning capacity, $1.2 million for past pain
and suffering, and $200,000 in future pain and suffering.
C. OTHER GOVERNMENT LLkIiLITY
In Miller v. United States,174 the plaintiff, who was a midship-
man at the U.S. Naval Academy, was injured during a training
session. Furthermore, he alleged that his injuries were exac-
erbated by improper medical care received at a government
medical center who attempted to treat his injuries.3 76 The fed-
eral government raised the Feres doctrine, which "is a'judicially
created exception to the broad waiver of immunity established
374 42 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1995).
375 Id. at 299.
376 Id. at 300.
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by the FTCA."377 The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff was to
be considered a member of the Armed Forces, and, therefore,
his initial injury was incident to his service as a midshipman re-
gardless of whether he was on active duty at the time. 78 Fur-
thermore, the medical treatment he received thereafter flowed
directly from the training accident, and, therefore, assuming
there was any medical malpractice committed, it was equally
barred. 79
Borden v. Veterans Administration30 ° was brought by a member
of the United States military who brought a FTCA claim against
the United States, alleging medical malpractice that occurred
when he was treated for an injury sustained on active duty.38 '
The plaintiff was injured playing basketball "off duty." The med-
ical treatment was provided at a military hospital, but included
treatment from both military and civilian medical personnel.
The United States argued that plaintiff's action was barred
based upon the Feres doctrine, which precludes personal injury
tort liability of the United States to military personnel.8 2 In the
case at bar, the First Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, stating
that the doctrine was applicable regardless of the medical condi-
tion treated or the fact that some of the treating medical person-
nel were civilian employees.3 8 3
In County Commission of Morgan County, West Virginia v. United
States,8 4 the Morgan County West Virginia Commission sought
to recover expenses of approximately ten thousand dollars,
which it incurred when an Air National Guard C130 struck
power lines and crashed, releasing jet fuel at the crash site. Mor-
gan County asserted causes of action under the FTCA, the Air
National Guard Act, CERCLA, and contract principles. The
court granted the motions to dismiss of both the state and fed-
eral defendants, holding that the state was immune under the
Eleventh Amendment and that the federal claim was not com-
pensable as "money damages for injury or loss of property"
under the FTCA.
377 Id. (recognizing the doctrine set forth in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S.
135 (1950)).
378 Id. at 304-05.
37 Id. at 307.
380 41 F.3d 763 (1st Cir. 1994).
38, Id. at 763.
382 Id.
383 Id. at 764.
384 No. 3:93CV64 (N.D.W.V. Nov. 23, 1994).
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IX. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
A. CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY
U.S. Fire Insurance Co. v. California Superior Courta5 arose out of
the crash of a twin engine DeHavilland aircraft after takeoff
from Perris Valley Airport, killing sixteen and injuring six per-
sons onboard. U.S. Fire, on behalf of the airport, settled with
plaintiffs for the policy limit of ten million dollars, reserving its
right to restitution and indemnification from nonsettling co-de-
fendants. Three other defendants settled for $1.125 million and
received a good-faith settlement approval, which immunized
DeHavilland from further exposure from those defendants.
The only remaining suit was U.S. Fire's cross-complaint against
DeHavilland for partial equitable indemnification.
The trial court held: (1) California law after Proposition 51
(the Fair Responsibility Act of 1986) does not allow for indem-
nity for non-economic damages; and (2) to recover for eco-
nomic damages in an indemnification action, a party must prove
the actual damages incurred by the plaintiff with whom the set-
ling party reached agreement. In its petition for review filed
with the California Supreme Court, U.S. Fire contended that it
should be able to recover noneconomic damages in the indem-
nity action against DeHavilland in an amount proportionate to
DeHavilland's fault. It also argued that it should not be re-
quired to prove the plaintiffs' actual economic and
noneconomic damages before recovering indemnification. In
settling, U.S. Fire argued that it relied on the long history of
case law which provides that it is sufficient for an indemnifica-
tion action for the settlement to be "reasonable."
B. CONFLICTS OF LAW
Palischak v. Allied Signal Aerospace Co.38 6 arose from the Janu-
ary 13, 1992, crash of a Cessna 421 which departed from
Milville, New Jersey, en route to Sebastian, Florida."8 ' Approxi-
mately four hours after takeoff, radar contact with the aircraft
was lost while the pilot was flying over the Atlantic Ocean off the
coast of Florida. The wreckage was eventually discovered
twenty-two nautical miles off the coast.388
W No. S045145 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Feb. 28, 1995).
386 893 F. Supp. 341 (D.N.J. 1995).
387 Id. at 343.
38 Id. at 344.
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Plaintiff filed a claim against the United States under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act alleging negligent handling by the air traf-
fic controllers. Plaintiff also brought suit against Allied Signal,
the manufacturer of the radar system installed in the aircraft, on
theories of products liability. The parties disagreed regarding
the applicability of the Death On The High Seas Act (DOHSA),
which, if applicable, would preempt state wrongful death reme-
dies outside the territorial waters of that state.389 The court
noted that a decision one year earlier from the Third Circuit
clearly addressed the question in Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor
Corp. 9' and, thus, held that DOHSA applied and plaintiff's
claims under the New Jersey Wrongful Death Act were pre-
empted.391 The court noted that this ruling precluded plain-
tiff's claims for nonpecuniary wrongful death damages since
such damages are not permitted under DOHSA. However, after
a review of the case law, the court found that the New Jersey
survival action, which permits claims for predeath pain and suf-
fering, was not precluded by DOHSA, and those claims were
permitted to proceed. 92
X. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore'93, the United States
Supreme Court reversed a punitive damages award of two mil-
lion dollars against BMW for failure to inform plaintiff that his
new car had been repainted before delivery. Compensatory
damages in the case had totalled only four thousand dollars.
Plaintiff had sued for fraudulent suppression of material fact
under Alabama state law and won an award of four thousand
dollars in ajury trial.3 94 The jury awarded four million dollars in
punitive damages, arriving at that figure by multiplying the four
thousand dollars by the approximately one thousand cars BMW
had refinished and sold throughout the United States in the
past ten years.3 95 The Alabama Supreme Court cut the award to
two million dollars, noting that a jury had punished BMW for
hundreds of transactions which had occurred outside of Ala-
bama. BMW argued that the decision represented a blatant
389 Id.
390 40 F.3d 622 (3d Cir. 1994).
391 Palischak, 893 F. Supp. at 346.
392 Id. at 350-51.
3ss 646 So. 2d 619 (Ala.), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
394 Id. at 621.
395 Id.
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violation of due process.396 Plaintiffs responded that a constitu-
tional argument similar to BMW's was rejected by the Supreme
Court in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Co. 397 The
TXO decision rejected an approach concentrating entirely on
the relationship between actual and punitive damages in favor
of a focus on the potential harm of a defendant's continued
conduct. TXO also specifically held out-of-state evidence as rele-
vant to the amount of punitive damages awarded. On Novem-
ber 6, 1995, the Supreme Court entered an order allowing
supplemental briefs to be filed, but on May 20, 1996, the Court
entered a judgment reversing the Supreme Court of Alabama's
decision.
In Santesson v. Travelair Insurance Co.,398 the First District
Court of Appeals of California reversed a forty-seven million-dol-
lar punitive damages award against Travelair Insurance Com-
pany, which had been assessed based upon an alleged bad-faith
violation of California's Insurance Code for failure to seek a set-
tlement of a wrongful death action against the insured, Beech
Aircraft Company. A wrongful death lawsuit had been filed by
the families of four men killed in a 1974 crash of a 1958 Beech-
craft Travelair 95 twin engine plane. This resulted in a $1.8 mil-
lion verdict against Beech, which was affirmed by the California
Supreme Court in 1984. In 1985, Beech and Travelair were
sued for bad-faith violation of the Insurance Code for failure to
seek a settlement despite Beech's "reasonably clear" liability.
Plaintiffs were awarded $550 in compensatory damages and
$57 million in punitive damages for malice, fraud, and oppres-
sion in "stonewalling" discovery requests. The trial judge had
granted Beech a new trial, and plaintiffs appealed.
The state appeals court panel reversed the punitive damages,
stating that although Travelair and its attorneys acted too ag-
gressively in defending Beech's interests, their actions in no way
met the necessary standard for such an award. The appeals
court felt that there was no clear and convincing evidence that
the defendants acted with the necessary evil intent, dishonesty,
or cruel indifference to plaintiffs' rights so as to qualify as "des-
picable conduct." Plaintiffs filed a petition for review with the
California Supreme Court.
'96 Id. at 629.
397 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
398 No. A055168 (Cal. Ct. App. May 17, 1995).
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Management Computer Services, Inc. v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie &
Co.399 involved the review of a jury's award of $1.75 million in
punitive damages in a breach of contract, unjust enrichment,
and conversion of software case. Plaintiff Management Com-
puter Services, Inc. (MCS) and defendants entered into a con-
tract for licensing of MCS software. MCS alleged that
defendants conspired to copy, use, and sell MCS's proprietary
software without its authorization. 00 The jury found that de-
fendants breached the contract and awarded damages of more
than $2.5 million for breach of contract and unjust enrichment,
as well as $5140 to defendants on a counterclaim. 40 1 The jury
also awarded MCS $65,000 for the defendants' conversion of the
software and added $1.75 million in punitive damages for the
conversion.40 2 The trial court reduced several of the awards and
ordered MCS to either accept only $50,000 in punitive damages
or opt for a new trial on the issue."° MCS opted for a new trial,
after which the judge dismissed MCS's claim for punitive
damages.
A divided panel of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that
the jury's award of $1.75 million was excessive. 404 However, it
rejected the trial court's decision to reduce the award to
$50,000.405 The court held that the punitive damages award was
too high and should be reduced to $650,000-ten times the
award of actual damages.40 6 The court stated that the reduced
punitive damages award of $50,000 was insufficient to punish
defendants and deter others in the future from similar
wrongdoing. 40 7
XI. FAA ENFORCEMENT REGULATIONS
A. CERTIFICATE ACTIONS
In Gilliland v. FAA,408 the pilot admitted a conspiracy to dis-
tribute cocaine, to engage in interstate travel in the aid of racke-
teering, and to avoid the filing of currency transaction reports.
399 539 N.W.2d 111 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
400 Id. at 116.
401 Id. at 116-17.
402 Id. at 117.
403 Id.
404 Id. at 124-25.
405 Id. at 124.
406 Id. at 125.
407 Id.
408 Aviation Litig. Rep. (Andrews Publications) 21,498 (8th Cir. Feb. 21, 1995).
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However, the pilot claimed that his admissions were made in
response to threats on his life. He noted his guilty plea on an
application for an FAA medical certificate, and the FAA re-
sponded by revoking his pilot certificate. An FAA administrative
law judge granted the agency's motion for summary judgment,
and the NTSB upheld the order. The pilot, Gilliland, then ap-
pealed to the Eighth Circuit.
The circuit court ruled that Gilliland, in opposing summary
judgment, had failed to show evidence of mitigating circum-
stances or present facts to support his allegation that at the crim-
inal prosecution stage it had been promised that a guilty plea
would not affect his pilot status. The appeals court did caution
that when an agency has the discretion to choose between sus-
pension and resignation, and the respondent presents material
issues of fact, the agency must hold a hearing and articulate why
it has chosen the more severe penalty, especially when the re-
spondent's livelihood is at stake. In the present case, however,
the court could not say that the agency abused its discretion in
revoking Gilliland's certificate without affording him an eviden-
tiary hearing in view of his failure to prove his claims.
In Reno v. NTSB,0 9 Reno had made an unauthorized intru-
sion into the San Diego terminal control area during an August
1988 flight. An FAA safety inspector had determined that he
did not have the proper endorsement on his student pilot certif-
icate, had made solo flights without an authorized instructor en-
dorsing his log book within the required ninety days preceding
the flight, and had made cross-country flights without log book
endorsements indicating that his instructor had reviewed his
preflight preparation. The FAA suspended his certificate for
twenty days. On appeal, an FAA administrative law judge re-
duced the suspension to ten days, finding that Reno was compe-
tent and qualified to make flights and had not actually
compromised aviation safety. The NTSB upheld the suspension,
and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Ninth Circuit noted that
the NTSB's interpretation of the relevant FAR was not arbitrary
and capricious. The Ninth Circuit felt that Reno's failure to
comply with the regulations on endorsements and log books
constituted sanctionable violations.
In Grillo v. NTSB,41° the FAA had revoked pilot Marco Grillo's
ATP and CFI certificates for falsifying airman certification
409 45 F.3d 1375 (9th Cir. 1995).
410 No. 93-70935, 1995 WL 295305 (9th Cir. May 11, 1995).
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records in violation of the applicable FARs.4 11 Grillo had falsely
reported to the FAA that three pilots he had tested failed their
flight checks when they had actually passed. His explanation
was that his actions were an attempt to meet what he perceived
as the FAA's "required" failure rate. Grillo also argued that the
FAA Administrator violated his due process rights by finding
that his actions were detrimental to aviation safety, arguing that
safety could not be affected because the three pilots were quali-
fied airmen.41 2 The NTSB affirmed the revocations, and Grillo
appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that Grillo's argument-
that the impact of his conduct on air safety should be judged
solely by reference to the qualifications of the three airmen-
ignores the FAA's larger interest in the integrity of its airman
certification system.413 The NTSB had pointed out that inaccu-
rate record keeping may prevent the FAA from making a timely
discovery of a designated pilot examiner's (DPE) inadequate
testing practices, thus calling into question the qualifications of
both the DPE's and the individuals they certificate.4"4 Grillo did
not dispute that his "false failures" allowed him to avoid stepped-
up monitoring of his performance as a DPE.41 5 In consideration
of this evidence, the Ninth Circuit felt that there was substantial
evidence supporting the NTSB's finding that Grillo's conduct
had a negative impact on air safety. Furthermore, the court
held that the NTSB did not violate Grillo's constitutional rights
by finding that he compromised air safety. 1 6
In Borregard v. NTSB,1 7 a Mechanic's Certificate and Inspec-
tion Authority had been revoked by the FAA due to alleged falsi-
fication of a log book and an attempted coverup. The FAA had
revoked Borregard's certificates, and the full NTSB affirmed.
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Borregard claimed he had not
intended to defraud the FAA, but merely to mislead those who
would rely on the records in question.4"' However, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the revocation, finding substantial evidence in
support of the FAA's actions and also holding that the penalty
411 Id. at *1.
412 Id.
413 Id. at *5.
414 Id. at *4-5.
415 Id.
416 Id. at *1-2.
417 46 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 1995).
418 Id. at 946.
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was appropriate in light of the gravity of the infraction. 19 The
court noted that there was substantial evidence that Borregard
intended to defraud the FAA, having knowingly presented false
information and incorrect inspection dates.420
Echo, Inc. v. FAA, 421 involved a helicopter flown by petitioner
Echo, Inc., which ran out of fuel and lost engine power during
an emergency medical evacuation flight. Prior to the crash, a
weather emergency had developed, and the pilot obtained IFR
clearance, accepted a higher altitude, and flew on for another
thirty minutes.4 22 However, the pilot failed to advise air traffic
control concerning the weather emergency or that he, his com-
pany, and his aircraft were unauthorized to fly under IFR condi-
tions.428 Three passengers were killed, while the pilot, John
Rafter, survived the ensuing crash. The FAA charged Echo and
Rafter with numerous violations and revoked the pilot's certifi-
cate and Echo's operating certificate.424 The NTSB reduced
Rafter's penalty to a 180-day suspension but upheld the Echo
certificate revocation. 425 The NTSB stated that once Rafter was
no longer able to fly under VFR rules, he should have asked air
traffic control for assistance in landing as soon as possible, and
the emergency weather conditions which developed did not ex-
cuse the violations caused by sustained IFR operation.426
On appeal, Echo argued that revocation is appropriate only
upon a finding of lack of qualifications manifested by deliber-
ate, repeated, or flagrant violations. 427 The First Circuit panel
rejected this argument and also rejected the pilot's argument
that the NTSB had abused its discretion in finding that his con-
duct during the flight was relevant to his qualifications to man-
age Echo's operations. 428 The First Circuit held that Rafter was
not excused from his managerial misconduct because he was pi-
loting the aircraft at the time of the crash.4 9
419 Id. at 946-47.
420 Id.
421 48 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1995).
422 Id. at 9-10.
423 Id.
424 Id. at 10.
425 Id.
426 Id. at 10-11.
427 Id. at 11.
428 Id. at 12.
429 Id.
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B. CrvIL PENALTY ADMINISTRATIvE ASSESSMENT AcT
The Civil Penalty Administrative Assessment Act of 1992 (the
"1992 Act"), for the first time, gave the FAA the power to peti-
tion a federal court of appeals for a review of an adverse NTSB
decision if the Administrator determines that the decision will
have a "significant adverse impact on carrying out" his responsi-
bilities.4"' The Act also required for the first time that the Board
defer to the FAA's regulatory interpretations, unless the Board
finds an interpretation arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not ac-
cording to law.451 FAA v. NTSB & Rolun?3 2 was the first case
decided pursuant to the FAA's exercise of the petition power.
In this case, the FAA had suspended the ATP certificate of a
Wings West pilot for ninety days for making a VFR departure
from an airport, allegedly when ground visibility was below
three miles, and for descending his aircraft below its assigned
altitude. The pilot appealed to the NTSB. An administrative
law judge affirmed the FAA's suspension order.4 33 The full
Board reversed, finding that the FAA had not borne its burden
of proving that the visibility was less than three miles at the time
of takeoff. 43 4 The NTSB also accepted Rolund's explanation
that he had not heard the controller instruct him to stay at or
above 2500 feet.4 35
The FAA petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for
review, arguing that its regulations require a pilot to obtain and
rely upon an official report of ground visibility if it is available
and to make ground visibility "as reported by an accredited ob-
server" conclusive in determining whether a VFR takeoff is per-
mitted. 4 16 The FAA further contended that the NTSB's decision
to the contrary was based upon a novel interpretation of FAA
regulations rather than upon the FAA's reasonable interpreta-
tion of its own regulations.43 7
The D.C. Circuit Court denied the FAA's petition, holding
that the issue of deference was never clearly raised before the
Board, citing 49 U.S.C. § 1153(b) (4).438 The court found it dis-
430 49 U.S.C. § 1153(c) (1994).
431 Id. § 44709(d) (3).
432 57 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
433 Id. at 1146.
434 Id.
435 Id.
436 Id. at 1147.
437 Id.
43 Id. at 1149.
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turbing that the NTSB did not inquire into or consider itself
bound by the FAA's interpretation of the applicable regula-
tions.43 9 However, the D.C. Circuit Court found it equally dis-
concerting that the FAA had at no time stepped forward to
articulate its own interpretation of the regulations to which it
expected deference.440 Therefore, the appellate court declined
to entertain the FAA's objections raised for the first time in a
petition for review. The D.C. Court of Appeals noted that based
upon the evidence, a reasonable Board might conclude that the
FAA had not shown that ground visibility was less than three
miles when Rolund took off." 1 The court felt that the Board's
findings were supported by substantial evidence in the record."2
With respect to proper procedure for an FAA review petition
under the Act, the court decided that the NTSB, which had filed
a brief in this case, is not a proper party to an FAA petition for
review.44s The court stated that "the Board's role is purely adju-
dicatory," and that the real parties in interest, the FAA and the
respondent who won the case before the Board, are before the
court with no need for the Board to participate. 4
The 1992 Act also requires that the Board give deference to
"written agency policy guidance available to the public related
to sanctions. " 445 Prior to the 1992 Act, the FAA had distributed
to its inspectors and lawyers an enforcement Sanction Guidance
Table as an appendix to its Order 215.3. Since the 1992 Act, it
has been questionable whether anyone has seriously considered
the Table in the internal FAA Order to be considered as "avail-
able to the public." However, the Board has now determined
that it is bound by the FAA Sanction Guidance Table contained
in the FAA Internal Order.
This issue arose in Administrator v. Hans-Jorn Stange,446 a case in
which the FAA revoked the pilot certificate of an airman who
operated an aircraft while his certificate was suspended. The
pilot was confused about when or where to surrender his sus-
pended certificate and assumed that as long as he had the certif-
439 Id. at 1148.
44 Id.
-1 Id. at 1151.
44-2 Id. at 1151-52.
-3 Id. at 1147.
4" Id.
-5 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d) (3).
446 NTSB Order No. EA-4375, available inWEs-tAw, 1995 WL 416156 (June 29,
1995).
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icate in his possession, he was authorized to operate an aircraft.
Upon appeal of the revocation, the judge reduced the sanction
to a one-year suspension and the FAA appealed the reduced
sanction to the full Board. The NTSB remanded the case to the
law judge, stating as follows:
Although not raised by the Administrator on appeal, we must ac-
knowledge that, while, by law, the Board may amend, modify, or
reverse the Administrator's order, the Board is bound by the Ad-
ministrator's written sanction policy guidance, as well as all val-
idly adopted interpretations of laws and regulations. The
Administrator's sanction guidance table, which represents the
range of sanction for a single violation of a particular regulation,
lists only emergency revocation as the sanction for "operation
while pilot certificate is suspended."447
In Administrator v. Edwards,44 a pilot had his ATP certificate
revoked on an emergency basis for failure to submit to a drug
test. He appealed the revocation to the NTSB, and the FAA
moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely. An appeal of an emer-
gency order must be filed within ten days after service of the
order. The period provided for appeal in nonemergency cases
is twenty days. In this case, the pilot filed his appeal six days
after the expiration of the ten-day time period, but within the
twenty-day period. The pilot waived the applicability of the
emergency rule, then argued that the time provided in the non-
emergency cases applied. The Board disagreed, holding that an
airman's ability to waive the applicability of the emergency rules
does not mean that an airman's failure to comply with the time
limit established by the emergency rules will be treated as a
waiver of those rules or as an election to proceed under the non-
emergency rules.449
In Administrator v. Beauchemin,45 ° the FAA revoked a pilot's
certificate based upon his conviction of knowingly engaging in a
continuing criminal enterprise to import and distribute mari-
juana for economic gain. On appeal to the Board, one of the
arguments raised by the respondent was that the case should
have been dismissed pursuant to the Board's Stale Complaint
Rule, Rule 3. The case had been initiated more than six months
"7 Id. at *2 (citation omitted).
48 NTSB Order No. EA-4378, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 416193 (July 14,
1995).
449 Id. at *3.
450 NTSB Order No. EA-4371, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 362545 (June 6,
1995).
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after the FAA first became aware of respondent's conviction.
There is one exception to the Complaint Rule, in that it does
not apply to cases where the allegations of the complaint pres-
ent a legitimate issue of lack of qualifications. Accordingly, the
Board rejected the respondent's argument, holding that any
conviction involving the sale of drugs, even if it does not involve
the use of an aircraft, warrants revocation based on a lack of
qualification. 451 Therefore, the Stale Complaint Rule did not
apply.
In Administrator v. Chaparral Inc.,452 the FAA refused to pro-
duce in discovery certain portions of the FAA Enforcement In-
vestigative Report (EIR), claiming that the information was
protected by either a work product or deliberative process privi-
lege. A law judge dismissed the FAA's Emergency Order against
respondents' certificates because of the failure to produce. The
full Board upheld the claim of privilege, reversing and remand-
ing the case for hearing on the merits. The decision does not
explain how or why the information is protected from discovery.
However, apparently, the FAA will not be forced to disclose on
discovery the following portions of the EIR: Block Items 18, 25,
26, 29, 30, and 31 of Section A and the analysis portion of
Section D.453
In Thompson v. Administrator,454 the applicant was successful in
getting the Administrator's complaint against him dismissed as
stale under the Board's rules. The applicant then sought and
received an award under EAJA for attorneys' fees and expenses.
The Administrator, on appeal, challenged the amount awarded,
including an award of $1,502.50 for photocopying. The Board
disallowed the photocopying expense, indicating that a con-
clusory invoice which only identified a lump sum of $1,502.50
for photocopying was not enough to permit reimbursement,
given the unusually large sum billed for this service. The Ad-
ministrator also argued that the judge should have denied re-
covery of attorneys' fees for preparation of several motions and
a supplemental brief which contained arguments that were
moot and would not have prevailed. The Board indicated that it
would not second-guess the strategy employed by applicant's
451 Id. at *2-3.
452 NTSB Order No. EA-4372, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 362520 (June 9,
1995).
453 Id. at *1.
454 NTSB Order No. EA-4353, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 319494 (Apr. 20,
1995).
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counsel and that it could not find that the motions and brief
were frivolous.455
XII. BANKRUPTCY
In Epstein v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors,45 plaintiff
David Epstein had been appointed as legal representative of a
class called the "Future Claimants," a group that had been de-
fined by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of
Florida as "[a]ll persons ... who may... [in the future] assert a
claim or claims.., against Piper or its successor arising out of or
relating to aircraft or parts manufactured and sold, designed,
distributed, or supported by Piper....,, In July 1993, Epstein
filed a one hundred million-dollar proof of claim on behalf of
the future claimants. The bankruptcy court disallowed the
proof of claim, and the district court affirmed.458 Pursuant to
the Bankruptcy Code, only those parties holding preconfirma-
tion claims have the legal right to share in payments under a
Chapter 11 plan.459
Epstein contested the district court's application of the prepe-
tition relationship test, arguing that the relevant conduct giving
rise to the alleged liability was Piper's prepetition manufacturer
design, sale, and distribution of allegedly defected aircraft."0
The Eleventh Circuit Court affirmed the district court, holding
that Epstein's interpretation of "claim" and application of the
conduct test would enable anyone to hold a claim against Piper
by virtue of their potential exposure to any aircraft in the ex-
isting fleet.461 The court also found, however, that the district
court's tests unnecessary restricted the claimant's class to those
who could be identified prior to filing of the petition.462
The court adopted what it called the "Piper test" pursuant to
which an individual had a Section 101 (5) claim against a debtor
manufacturer if "(i) events occurring before the confirmation
create a relationship, such as contact, exposure, impact, or priv-
ity, between the claimant and the debtor's product; and (ii) the
basis for liability is the debtor's prepetition conduct in design-
455 Id. at *2-3.
456 58 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 1995).
457 Id. at 1575.
458 Id. at 1575-76.
459 Id. at 1576.
460 Id. at 1577.
461 Id. at 1577-78.
462 Id.
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ing, manufacturing and selling the allegedly defective or dan-
gerous products."4 63 The court then held that it was clear that
the future claimants failed the minimum requirements of the
Piper test. There was no preconfirmation exposure to a specific
identifiable defective product or any other relationship between
Piper and the broadly defined class of Future Claimants. 46 4
XIII. TAXATION
In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, Michigan,465 seven
airlines brought suit against the owner and operator of Michi-
gan's Kent County International Airport, challenging the valid-
ity of airport user fees imposed by the airport owner as being
discriminatory and unreasonable, violative of the Commerce
Clause and in violation of the Federal Anti-Head Tax. 6 The
airport collected charges from airlines, as well as general avia-
tion and nonaviation concessionaires such as rental car, restau-
rant, and gift shop operators. The U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve a conflict between the decision of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit which upheld the charges
and a previous decision from the Seventh Circuit in the case of
Indianapolis Airport Authority v. American Airlines, Inc."7 The
Court held that these types of fees are reasonable and, thus, not
violative of the Anti-Head Tax "if it (1) is based on some fair
approximation of the facility's use, (2) is not excessive in rela-
tion to the benefits conferred, and (3) does not discriminate
against interstate commerce."468
American Airlines, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Board of
Finance and Revenueg9 involved an appeal by USAir and Ameri-
can Airlines concerning the issue of whether food, nonalcoholic
beverages, and related nonfood supplies furnished by airlines
during commercial flights are subject to the state's use tax.470
Both USAir and American had been assessed use taxes and had
appealed to the Department of Revenue Board of Appeals and
Board of Finance and Revenue. The airlines had unsuccessfully
463 Id. at 1577.
464 Id. at 1578.
465 114 S. Ct. 855 (1994).
4w Id. at 857.
467 733 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1984).
4N8 Northwest Airlines, 114 S. CL at 864 (citing Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport
Authority Dist. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707, 716-17 (1972)).
469 665 A.2d 417 (Pa. 1995).
470 Id. at 418.
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sought a refund with the Board of Appeals, and the petition for
review with the Board of Finance and Revenue was denied.
The decision was reversed by the Commonwealth Court, but
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed in turn. The majority
noted that section 7201 (o) of the Tax Code excluded tangible
personal property from the use tax if it is used "directly" in the
operation of a public utility in rendering the public utility ser-
vice.471 The court stated that the items which Pennsylvania was
seeking to tax (food, beverages, and related nonfood items) are
unquestionably not necessary and integral to directly delivering
a public utility service to the public, namely the provision of
transportation by air. The court felt that its holding was corrob-
orated by the fact that not all flights provide food and beverage,
thus demonstrating that food and beverage are not necessary or
integral for the airlines to perform their operations in render-
ing transport by air of passengers. Since the subject items were
not directly used in the supply of a public utility service, they
were not subject to the state's use tax.4 7 2
In Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Department of Food and Agriculture,473 a
petition for review was filed with the California Supreme Court
by five airlines contesting California's eighty-five-dollar charge
for every international flight arriving in the state. The charge
was made pursuant to the California Airport and Maritime Plant
Quarantine Inspection and Plant Protection Act and was insti-
tuted in 1990 as part of a program to eradicate the Mediterra-
nean fruit fly. The airlines argue that the state Act violates the
Federal Anti-Head Tax Act (AHTA). California's Second Dis-
trict Court of Appeals had previously held that the fee was not
subject to the AHTA because it was imposed on all international
commercial flights arriving in California not just those carrying
passengers.474 Therefore, the fee was based on criteria other
than "persons or the carriage of persons traveling in air com-
merce" and thus not prohibited by the AHTA.475
471 Id. at 419.
472 Id. at 422-27.
473 39 Cal. Rptr.2d 426 (Ct. App. 1995) (the Supreme Court petition was re-
printed in Aviation Litig. Rep. (Andrews Publications) 21,759 (Mar. 27, 1995).




In United States v. Bocook,476 Rodney Bocook pled guilty to
wilfully communicating false information and thereby endan-
gering aircraft for events which took place between August 1,
1993 and September 22, 1993. During that time, Mr. Bocook
allegedly broadcast unauthorized radio messages to aircraft and
air traffic controllers in the area of Roanoke, Virginia.4 77 On
numerous occasions, he pretended to be an air traffic controller
at the Roanoke Regional Airport and gave instructions to pilots
who were preparing to land. At other times, he instructed in-
coming pilots to change frequencies or to break off their ap-
proach, told pilots they were not clear to land after they had
been cleared to land by the tower, told pilots their runway was
closed because of a disabled aircraft on the runway, and told
landing pilots to hold short of a runway intersection. He in-
structed a departing plane to climb to 12,000 feet after it had
been cleared to go to 10,000 feet. Bocook repeated the instruc-
tion four times when the pilot requested clarification. Bocook
also transmitted distress signals supposedly coming from aircraft
and briefly pretended to be the medivac helicopter based at Ro-
anoke Memorial Hospital on two occasions. In addition,
Bocook used obscene language, harassed a female air traffic
controller, made threats to shoot down aircraft, and transmitted
recorded music, weather reports, and warnings about his own
activities.
After his guilty plea, he was sentenced to a total term of
124 months. He then appealed his sentence, contending that
the district court erred in finding that his conduct involved "in-
tentionally endangering the safety of aircraft" and, therefore,
should not have enhanced his sentence pursuant to the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.7 8 On June 21, 1995, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the sen-
tence.4 79 In rejecting Bocook's argument, the court held that
"[a] reasonable person would under no circumstances transmit
false instructions to pilots under the pretense of being an air
traffic controller because of the obvious risks involved. '4 0 The
476 59 F.3d 167 (4th Cir. 1995) (unpublished disposition), available in
WESTLAW, 1995 WL 371250.
477 Id. at *1.
478 Id. at *1-2.
479 Id. at *2.
480 Id.
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court concluded that Mr. Bocook's conduct did, indeed, reck-
lessly endanger an aircraft.
United States v. Holtz a  is another case in which the court con-
sidered a sentence above that which would normally be imposed
under the 1987 Guidelines Manual for Federal Criminal Sen-
tencing. In this case, the defendant was the principal of North-
east Jet Airlines. After a four-week trial, he was found guilty of
conspiracy to defraud the United States. 48 2 The standard range
of sentences would have been zero to six months. In this case,
the judge considered whether there existed "an aggravating or
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not ade-
quately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission
in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence
different from that described."48
The court noted the testimony of several witnesses concern-
ing Mr. Holtz's operation of the company, including a 1979 inci-
dent where he ordered a pilot to have an illegal mach override
switch installed in a Leer Jet (known as a "go fast" switch).484
The pilot refused, but Mr. Holtz had it installed anyway. The jet
eventually crashed and killed two other pilots. 485 The NTSB
linked the crash to the mach override switch. In 1986, Mr. Holtz
allegedly ignored the co-pilot's calculation of a fuel shortage
and refused to make an intermediate landing on a trip to Eng-
land. The aircraft eventually landed with five minutes of fuel
remaining. Holtz ordered the co-pilot to falsify the flight mani-
fest.486 The court noted that double sets of maintenance logs
were kept and cited other examples of conduct it considered to
be sufficient to justify a departure from the Sentencing Guide-
lines.487 The court imposed a sentence of forty-one months of
imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release and
a $250,000 fine.
481 No. 92-459-01, 1995 WL 312537 (E.D. Pa. 1995).




486 Id. at *2.
487 Id. at *3.
